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iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2007) confers jurisdiction on this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Matrix appeals from the trial court's (1) grant of Innerlight's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; (2) denial of Matrix's Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
(3) the rulings on the parties' respective Motions to Strike. While Matrix 
characterizes these questions as presenting four issues for review, in substance this 
appeal involves only two: (1) whether the trial court properly disposed of the 
cross motions for summary judgment; and (2) whether the trial court was within 
the bounds of its discretion in its rulings on the competing motions to strike. 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly resolve the parties' cross motions 
for summary judgment when it granted Innerlight's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Matrix's? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's decision on summary 
judgment, this court reviews "whether the trial court correctly applied the 
governing law and correctly ruled that there were no disputed issues of material 
fact." Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 1999 UT 34, If 9, 976 P.2d 1213. 
Issue No.2: Did the trial court correctly resolve the parties' motions to 
strike? 
Standard of Review: To the extent that the trial court's decision hinged 
upon its determination that the evidence involved was admissible or inadmissible 
as a matter of law, the decision is reviewed for correctness, but to the extent that 
1 
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the court's decision resulted from its inherent authority to evaluate the 
admissibility of evidence, the decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
Fordv. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, \ 33, n. 5, 98 P.3d 15. 
The posture Matrix has assumed on appeal also presents this Court with the 
following additional issue which is dispositive of Matrix's appeal:. 
Issue No. 3: Are Matrix's arguments on appeal precluded by alternative, 
dispositive trial court rulings that Matrix failed to challenge and brief on appeal, 
and which are now considered established? 
Standard of Review: Issues decided by the trial court and not challenged 
on appeal are considered abandoned and thus summarily affirmed. See, e.g., 
Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, fflf 17-20, 79 P.3d 974. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No Constitutional Provisions are involved. However, to the extent 
necessary for this Court to fully review the Matrix's claims, Utah Code sections 
70A-1-103, 70A-2-201, 70A-2-208, and 70A-2-305(4) (2007) may be implicated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Innerlight, Inc. ("Innerlight") began this action by filing a petition 
for Declaratory Relief on March 13, 2006, (R.13.) Among other things, Innerlight 
asked the trial court to declare that the executory agreement (the "Agreement") 
that Innerlight had negotiated with The Matrix Group ("Matrix") was 
unenforceable because Matrix failed to satisfy a condition precedent to transform 
the Agreement from an executory document into an enforceable contract, (R. 13.) 
2 
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Innerlight subsequently filed an amended complaint which it served upon Matrix 
on April 20, 2006. (R. 24.) 
Matrix moved to dismiss Innerlight's complaint (R. 31), arguing that Utah 
was an improper venue for the parties' dispute. The trial court denied the motion. 
(R. 121.)1 Matrix filed an Answer and Counterclaim on July 21, 2007. (R. 110-
111.) 
Innerlight then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the trial court 
to declare the Agreement ineffective and unenforceable for failure of the condition 
precedent, which, if granted, would end the parties' dispute. (R. 136.) Matrix 
opposed Innerlight's Motion (R. 534), and filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 221.) 
In addition to its cross motion for summary judgment, Matrix moved to 
strike a single paragraph of the Affidavit of Innerlight's Wesley Tate ("Tate"), 
which Innerlight had filed to support its summary judgment motion. (R. 412.) 
Innerlight later moved to strike sections of the Third Affidavit of Matrix's 
Anthony Catinella, which Matrix had attached to its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 720, 743.) Matrix did not 
oppose Innerlight's motion to strike. (R. 878-79.) 
Matrix does not appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
3 
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The trial court heard argument on these motions on January 17, 2007. (R. 
800:l-44.)2 On April 16, 2007, the court entered its judgment as well as its orders 
granting Innerlight's Motions for Summary Judgment, striking Portions of 
Anthony Catinella's Affidavit, and denying both of Matrix's Motions. (R. 877, 
879.) Copies of these Judgments and Orders are Attached as Addendum A. 
Matrix appeals only portions of the trial court's rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court stated (R. 887), and Matrix has conceded {see Matrix's Appellate 
Brief, p. 14) that the material facts are not in dispute. The parties executed an 
"Exclusive Distributor Agreement" (the "Agreement") in October 2004, (R. 408), 
a copy of which is Attached as Addendum B. Matrix agreed to appoint Innerlight 
as its exclusive distributor of Sassoon products, "all in accordance with and 
pursuant to the terms and conditions" of the Agreement See id. Under the 
Agreement "the acceptance of this appointment by [Innerlight] is conditioned 
upon [Innerlight's] written acceptance of [Matrix's] Product Price List which shall 
not be subject to change until October 17, 2006" (the "condition precedent"). See 
Addendum B, f 2(b). Matrix did not supply Innerlight with a Product Price List. 
(R. 180-81, 880.) Innerlight did not provide a written acceptance of a Product 
Price List. (R. 180-81, 880.) The Agreement further stated that Matrix—not 
Innerlight—had the right to "require" Beverly Sassoon to make appearances, and 
2
 The transcript of these proceedings appears in the Record Index as R. 800. 
Innerlight's reference to material within the transcript will begin with the record 
cite "R. 800" followed by the cited pages. 
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it offered to cause Ms. Sassoon to appear at Innerlight functions up to four times 
per year. See id.,]A. In October 2004, before the Agreement was signed, Matrix 
caused Beverly Sassoon to attend an Innerlight function, an action that Matrix 
duplicated later in March 2005. (R. 717.) 
In the event that the condition precedent was satisfied, Innerlight agreed to 
pay Matrix $750,000.00 for Sassoon products during the first effective year of the 
resulting contract, $1.5 million dollars during the next twelve month period, and at 
least $4 million dollars during each subsequent twelve month period thereafter, 
with the required purchases and payments being received by Matrix in quarterly 
allotments. See id., f 5 (a)-(c). Finally, the Agreement stated: 
[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the 
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not 
be amended or modified except by written instrument signed 
by each of the parties hereto. . . . No party shall be 
construed as having waived any of its rights hereunder or to 
insist upon strict compliance by any other party with its 
obligations hereunder, nor any custom or practice of the 
parties at variance with the terms hereof, shall constitute a 
waiver of any party's right to demand exact compliance with 
the terms hereof. . . . No representations, inducements, 
promises or agreements, oral or otherwise, between the 
parties not embodied herein or incorporated herein by 
reference shall be of any force or effect. 
Id,] 12. 
Innerlight made a one-time order to Matrix for five Sassoon products on 
October 11, 2004. (R. 181 (Tate Affidavit) Attached hereto as Addendum C.) 
Innerlight issued a separate purchase order for each of the five products, which 
had a value of approximately $250,000.00. (R. 180-82.) Innerlight's purchase 
5 
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order stated that the order was not made subject to any terms, and no reference to 
the Agreement was made. See id. Innerlight received the ordered product and 
paid the invoices. (R. 880.) Innerlight's payment was the only payment Innerlight 
made to Matrix. (R. 880.) Innerlight never placed a second order for any 
cosmetic product with Matrix. (R. 180-81, 880.) 
After certain efforts to market the Sassoon product, having never received a 
Product Price List from Matrix, Innerlight informed its distributors that they 
should discontinue efforts to sell the product, and informed Matrix that their 
efforts to form a contract had failed. (R. 402 (Catinella Affidavit).) Innerlight 
then filed its action seeking a declaration that the Agreement was unenforceable. 
(R. 13,881.) 
The trial court determined that the condition precedent had not been 
satisfied, rendering the Agreement ineffective and unenforceable. (R. 877-97.) 
Matrix now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's summary judgment rulings should be affirmed (and 
Matrix's arguments on appeal fail) on multiple, alternative grounds. 
First, Matrix fails to challenge trial court rulings that supply alternative 
bases for the court's summary judgment decision. Because of Matrix's failure, 
these rulings are deemed established, and are fatal to Matrix's appeal. Among 
these unchallenged rulings are the following: that the parties' executory agreement 
fell within the ambit of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and 
6 
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Innerlight's purchase order was insufficient under the UCC to satisfy the 
Agreement's condition precedent; that Innerlight's purchase order at most 
constituted a one-time contract that had been satisfied; that under the UCC and the 
terms of the parties' Agreement, no "course of performance" was permitted to 
alter, modify, or void provisions of the executory agreement; that under the UCC's 
statute of frauds for the sale of goods (Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(l)), the 
purchase orders could not establish pricing for an overall, enforceable contract; 
that the UCC barred Matrix's waiver argument, but even if it did not, Innerlight 
timely revoked any waiver in writing; that Matrix failed to preserve the affirmative 
defense of "ratification" and thus waived the right to assert it; that Matrix's 
estoppel theory was barred under the terms of the UCC, and particularly section 
70A-2-208 and the UCC's statute of frauds; and that the Agreement was not an 
enforceable contract under UCC § 70A-2-305(4) because the parties did not intend 
to be bound by contract absent agreed upon fixed pricing, and no fixed pricing was 
agreed to. (R. 877-96; see Addendum A.) 
Matrix does not challenge or brief these and other trial court rulings. 
Matrix fails even to acknowledge that the trial court made these rulings, opting 
instead to reargue select portions of claims as if the trial court's alternative rulings 
did not exist. However, each trial court ruling that Matrix has failed to challenge 
and brief should now be considered established and binding on appeal. And these 
unchallenged rulings independently establish the trial court's summary judgment 
decisions and preclude Matrix's arguments on appeal. 
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Second, even if this Court chose to consider the merits of Matrix's 
arguments (and it need not address them), the outcome is unchanged. 
A, The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Matrix's "Fulfillment" 
Theory. 
First, Matrix failed to satisfy its obligation under the condition precedent; 
Matrix never produced the required Product Price List, and Innerlight supplied no 
written acceptance of a Matrix company price list required under the Agreement to 
meet the condition. Second, Matrix's evidence of fulfillment (Matrix's "12 
actions") is barred from consideration at trial and on appeal under the Agreement 
and UCC, as unchallenged trial court rulings confirm. Third, and alternatively, the 
Agreement's integration clause (Agreement If 12) precludes Matrix's argument 
under the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20, *| 11, — P.3d— (quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 
1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)), because Matrix's theory is incorrectly dependant on 
alleged pre-Agreement oral understandings on price, information beyond the 
Agreement's four corners. Fourth, even if the Agreement's integration term did 
not preclude Matrix's "evidence" (and it does), Matrix had no admissible evidence 
of an alleged oral understanding on pricing. Based on Innerlight's unopposed 
motion to strike regarding the third Affidavit of Matrix's Anthony Catinella, the 
trial court struck from consideration the portions of the affidavit on which Matrix 
depends for its evidence. Fifth, the Innerlight purchase orders to which Matrix 
cites were ruled insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an "acceptance" for 
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overall contract pricing. Matrix does not challenge these rulings on appeal. Thus, 
any claim of error is deemed abandoned. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Matrix's "Ratification" 
Theory. 
First, as with Matrix's fulfillment theory, Matrix's failure to challenge 
dispositive trial court rulings precludes Matrix's ratification claim. Second, the 
trial court correctly ruled that "ratification" is an affirmative defense that Matrix 
failed to plead and preserve under rule 12(h), Utah R. Civ. P. This unchallenged 
ruling should now be deemed established. Third, no "ratification" occurred 
sufficient to excuse or satisfy the condition precedent of paragraph 2(b) because 
Matrix's ratification evidence is precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings. 
Fourth, for Innerlight to have "ratified" the Agreement as Matrix suggests, 
Innerlight had to confirm its "acceptance" of the enforceability of the Agreement 
by fully performing under its terms through, among other points of performance, 
making mandatory quarterly payments and purchases. See Addendum B, f 5. 
However, Innerlight undisputedly did not make these payments. Fourth, even if 
Innerlight were found to have "ratified" the Agreement under Matrix's theory and 
is deemed to have accepted all terms of the Agreement, those terms still include 
the express condition precedent of paragraph 2(b). There is no other "contract" 
and Matrix cannot selectively delete terms it dislikes. Because the condition of 
paragraph 2(b) was unfulfilled, the Agreement did not become an enforceable 
contract in all events. 
9 
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C. Innerlight Did Not Waive Contract Rights 
The trial court correctly concluded that Innerlight had not waived its right to 
demand strict compliance with the terms of the Agreement. First, Matrix's waiver theory 
is precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings that Matrix's evidence on waiver is 
precluded from consideration under Agreement paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 (R. 887-
90); that Innerlight could not waive rights under the Agreement without an express 
written Innerlight waiver and Innerlight provided no written waiver; and that even if 
Matrix could establish waiver, Innerlight properly revoked the waiver under UCC § 2-
209(5). Because Matrix assigns no error on appeal regarding these rulings and does not 
brief them, any claim concerning them is waived. Second, even if Matrix's waiver theory 
were not precluded as shown above (and it is), Matrix failed as a matter of law to 
establish that Innerlight "distinctly" and "unequivocally" waived its rights under the 
Agreement; Matrix could not meet the high standard of proof for such claims. 
D. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Matrix's Estoppel Claim 
The trial court's ruling on summary judgment, rejecting Matrix's estoppel 
theory should be affirmed on multiple alternative grounds. First, Matrix's 
estoppel theory is precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings that Matrix's 
evidence on estoppel (Matrix's same "twelve actions") is precluded from 
consideration under Agreement paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208. Second, even if 
Matrix's estoppel theory could be addressed on the merits on appeal, it fails as a 
matter of law because Matrix adduced no evidence that it relied on Innerlight's 
conduct. Third, even if Matrix had adduced evidence of reliance on Innerlight's 
conduct (and it did not), the trial court ruled that Matrix's reliance would have 
10 
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been unreasonable as a matter of law. Matrix does not challenge this ruling. 
Finally, Matrix may not invoke equity here and ask this Court to overlook 
Matrix's failure and to deprive Innerlight of its agreed-to rights under the 
Agreement based on a situation Matrix created through its own failure. 
E. The Trial Court's Rulings on Motions to Strike Should be 
Affirmed 
The Court should reject Matrix's challenge of the trial court's affidavit rulings, 
first, because Matrix failed on appeal to comply with rule 24, Utah R. App. P.; Matrix 
fails to explain the alleged error of the trial court, or to demonstrate the nature of the error 
with applicable authority. Second, the trial court exercised proper discretion in admitting 
Wesley Tate's Affidavit. Matrix does not question that Innerlight received the 
complaints Matrix challenges, that Tate's statements are the product of his personal 
knowledge or that courts regularly admit the content of customer complaints when the 
complaints merely support their existence. Third, the trial court's ruling, striking 
portions to Catinella's Third Affidavit, was also correct because Innerlight's Motion to 
Strike was unopposed, and because Catinella's affidavit was untimely. Finally, the 
challenged sections of Catinella's affidavit were properly stricken because they consisted 
of inadmissible content, and because the integration clause of Agreement precluded the 
offending sections. 
Consequently, this Court should reject each of Matrix's arguments on 
appeal and affirm the trial court's rulings. 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED INNERLIGHT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARED THE PARTIES' 
EXECUTORY AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE3 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment for Innerlight, and its denial of 
Matrix's similar motion, was proper, supported by the record, and mandated by 
the parties' executory agreement. The trial court's order rested on multiple, 
alternative rulings. (R. 877-97.) But Matrix does not challenge on appeal 
multiple, alternative trial court rulings which support the court's summary 
judgment ruling. Matrix has thus waived any claim of error as to those rulings. 
This is fatal to Matrix's appeal. But even if Matrix's appeal were not precluded by 
this failure (and it is), Matrix's claims were correctly resolved on the merits by the 
trial court, which correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts, as shown 
below. "In deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate, [this court] 
need review only whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant law and 
whether a material fact was in dispute." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. 
Corp., 2002 UT 88, ] 10, 54 P.3d 1139. 
3
 The trial court also concluded that judgment for Matrix was precluded by 
disputed material facts. (R. 882.) Matrix does not challenge this ruling or offer 
any substantive argument or briefing that would suggest that the trial court erred in 
its conclusion. In failing to mount a challenge to the trial court's conclusion on 
this issue, Matrix has waived any right to assert a claim of error. See Rukivina v. 
Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah 1997) (declining to address 
certain trial court rulings because the appellant failed to "specifically brief, argue, 
or offer evidence in support" of a challenge to the ruling). 
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A. The Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's Conclusion That 
The Condition Precedent Was Unsatisfied, Rendering The 
Parties9 Agreement Unenforceable.4 
1. The Summary judgment Order Should be Affirmed because 
Matrix Does Not Challenge Dispositive Trial Court Rulings. 
The trial court's summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because 
Matrix has failed to challenge on appeal the trial court's alternative grounds for 
summary judgment which now defeat Matrix's arguments on appeal. The trial 
court's order is comprehensive and was based on multiple, alternative grounds. 
(R. 877-971.) Each ruling that Matrix has failed to challenge on appeal is 
considered waived and abandoned by Matrix. See Am. Towers Owners Assoc, 
Inc. v. CCIMech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n. 5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed 
by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned."); Caroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT 
App 339, fflj 18-20, 79 P.3d 974 (discussing the minimum standards necessary to 
challenge a trial court's ruling and avoid abandoning any claim of error). See also 
Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988 P.2d 1 (stating that the appellant 
"has waived any challenge to this ruling by failing to raise, brief, or argue the 
4
 Matrix's assertion that the trial court erred in ruling that the condition precedent 
was not satisfied violates Utah R. App. P. 24, which requires an appealing party to 
cite this Court to authority supporting the position taken, and to develop that 
authority into a reasoned analysis of the issue sufficient to provide this Court with 
a foundation to address the arguments presented. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); 
State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 13, 99 P.3d 820. Failure to comply with rule 
24(a)(9) impermissibly shifts the burden of research and argument to this Court. 
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Matrix cites no relevant 
authority on this issue, merely offering the Court a limited, unsupported argument. 
Accordingly, Matrix's failure should result in this Court rejecting Matrix's 
argument on this issue. 
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issue"). A simple reference to the entire summary judgment, "by itself, certainly 
does not constitute the analysis required to sustain" an appeal of all of the issues 
contained in the summary judgment decision. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, f 18, 
(discussing the abandonment of issues on appeal in the context of a motion to 
dismiss). 
The alternative grounds not challenged by Matrix (now considered 
established) dispose of Matrix's appeal. These grounds include the following: (1) 
that the meaning and interpretation of the parties' Agreement are controlled by 
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") (R. 882-94); (2) that, under the UCC 
(Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-101 to -807 (2007)), Matrix could not resort to evidence 
not contemplated under the plain language of the Agreement (R. 884); (3) that 
under UCC §§70A-2-202 and 70A-2-208, Matrix is precluded from advancing 
evidence of any alleged prior agreements to vary the terms of the Agreement, and 
that Matrix could not attempt to assert a "course-of-performance" argument 
(related to Innerlight's submission of a purchase order and associated activities) in 
an effort to bypass the express condition precedent (R. 885-86); (4) that Matrix 
was barred under UCC 70A-2-201(l) (the statute of frauds for sales of goods) 
from asserting that Innerlight's one-time purchase-order price somehow 
established pricing for a multi-year, overall contract, bypassing the express 
condition precedent (R. 886-87); (5) that even if the Innerlight purchase order 
could have been considered by the court, UCC 70A-2-201(l) rendered the 
purchase order itself a contract just as to the quantity of goods ordered; thus, the 
14 
SLC 180629.1 
purchase order could not establish that the condition precedent had been satisfied 
to create an overall enforceable contract (R. 884, 886); (6) that under the UCC, 
even if Innerlight's action could have established a waiver of the condition 
precedent, Innerlight timely revoked its waiver, reviving the Agreement's 
provisions (R. 889); (7) that ratification, one of Matrix's theories on appeal, is an 
affirmative defense that Matrix failed to plead and thus waived (R. 890-91); and 
(8) that under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-305(4), the parties did not intend to be 
bound unless the price be fixed or agreed, and it was not fixed or agreed; thus, 
there is no contract (R. 882-83, 895.) Because this condition was not satisfied, "no 
overall contract exists under the UCC." (R. 896.) 
In sum, Matrix assigns no error on appeal to any of these alternative rulings 
or to key facts identified in the summary judgment order. Indeed, Matrix omits 
even to inform this Court that the summary judgment order includes these rulings, 
and omits to append the order to its brief, as Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1)(C) 
requires. By failing to challenge and brief these rulings, Matrix has waived any 
right to assign error to them, and has in effect conceded that the rulings are 
correct, as shown above.5 
5
 Innerlight will not brief the underlying bases of the unchallenged trial court 
rulings here. And by bringing Matrix's waiver to the court's attention, Innerlight, 
as Appellee, does not "raise a new matter" that would entitle the Matrix now to 
brief the issue in its reply brief. See, e.g., State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 21, 6 
P.3d 1116; State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, n. 3, 57 P.3d 1139. See also Eddy 
v. Albertson 's Inc., 2001 UT 88,121, 34 P.3d 781 (quoting Coleman v. Stevens, 
2000 UT 98, If 9, 17 P.3d 1122) ("[i]t is well established that [this court] 'will not 
consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief"). 
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Matrix is thus bound by these rulings which cause Matrix's arguments on 
appeal to fail Ignoring most of the trial court rulings, Matrix selectively argues on 
appeal only that (1) Innerlight fulfilled the condition precedent itself (Matrix 
appeal point "II"); (2) Innerlight waived or excused the condition precedent 
(Matrix point "III"); (3) Innerlight ratified the Agreement (Matrix point "IV"); and 
(4) Innerlight is estopped from denying an enforceable agreement (Matrix point 
"V"). But each Matrix argument is fatally dependant on Matrix's "evidence" that 
the trial court ruled was precluded by the Agreement and the UCC, as shown 
above. (R. 885-92.) Matrix does not challenge this. And each Matrix argument 
depends on pricing from the Innerlight purchase orders which the trial court ruled 
was barred by UCC §2-201(1). (R. 887.) Matrix does not challenge this. Each 
argument is also contradicted by the trial court's unchallenged ruling that no 
enforceable contract existed under UCC §2-305(4). (R. 895-96.) This ruling, too, 
goes unchallenged on appeal. In sum, each Matrix argument fails on appeal under 
the unchallenged summary judgment rulings (and other unchallenged rulings are 
identified below as Matrix's individual claims are addressed). These trial court 
rulings are now established as correct. The Court's analysis may end here. 
2. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Condition 
Precedent was Unsatisfied and that no Enforceable Contract 
Arose. 
Even if the unchallenged trial court rulings did not defeat Matrix's 
remaining theories on appeal (and they do), the trial court correctly determined 
that Matrix's arguments fail as a matter of law. 
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Interpretation of the parties' executory Agreement requires analysis of the 
Agreement's language, because courts "'"look to the writing itself to ascertain the 
parties' intentions, and [this Court] considers] each contract provision . . . in 
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring 
none.'"" WebBank, 2002 UT 88, \ 18 (citations omitted). "Utilizing ordinary 
rules of contract construction, if a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the 
court must construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary meaning." 
ELM, Inc. v. M.T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also 
Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. York, 2007 UT App 265, If 9, 167 P.3d 
523. 
Paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement (confirmed by paragraph 2(a)) is the 
critical provision in this dispute: 
(a) Subject to the terms and provisions set forth in 
this Agreement, [Matrix] hereby appoints [Innerlight] as 
the exclusive distributor of the Products . . . . 
(b) The acceptance of this appointment by 
[Innerlight] is conditioned upon [Innerlight's] written 
acceptance of [Matrix's] Product Price List which shall not 
be subject to change until October 17, 2006. 
Addendum B, Yll 2(a)(b). Matrix concedes that paragraph 2(b) creates a condition 
precedent. "Courts must respect express conditions precedent." Commercial 
Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court 
addressed the proper respect to be given to conditions precedent: 
[generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has 
any right to ignore or modify conditions which are clearly 
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expressed merely because it may subject on of the parties to 
hardship, but they must be enforced uin accordance with the 
intentions as . . . manifested by the language used by the 
parties to the contract." 
Id. (quoting Jones v. Acme Bldg. Prods, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 450 P.2d 743, 746 
(1969)). Where a condition precedent, like the express condition of paragraph 
2(b), remains unfulfilled, the obligor under a signed agreement has in essence no 
enforceable contract and no duty to perform. The Cantamar, L.L.C. v. 
Champagne, 2006 UT App 321,1J16, 142 P.3d 140 ("failure of a material 
condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform"), quoting Harper 
v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 1999 UT 34 (citing 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 630, at 20-21). This principle of law has applied to a purchase 
agreement even where money was exchanged. See Harper, 1999 UT 34, <[fl4. 
Here, the condition precedent expresses the intent of the parties. First, it 
confirms that the parties had not agreed on fixed pricing terms necessary to form 
an enforceable contract. Matrix conditioned its appointment of Innerlight as 
distributor, and Innerlight "conditioned" its acceptance of an appointment, on 
Innerlight's written acceptance of a fixed Matrix Product Price List. Addendum 
B, YI 2(a)(b). Matrix was to supply a Product Price List. Innerlight was able to 
evaluate the Product Price List and, if found acceptable, was to accept it in 
writing. Addendum B, Tf2(b). But the list never came, and Innerlight's "written 
acceptance" was never made. (R. 880.) Without the prerequisite acceptance, the 
Agreement was an unenforceable executory contract, and Innerlight's duties and 
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obligations under the overall Agreement also remained unenforceable. The 
Cantamar, 2006 UT App 321, <f 16; see also Brownsville Advanced Med. Imaging, 
L.P., v. Capitalwerks, LLC, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6360, (Tex. App. Corpus 
Christi [13th Dist.] 2005)(unpublished opinion) (based on unmet conditions, the 
court denied a motion to dismiss grounded on a forum-selection clause, 
concluding: "Brownsville Imaging was not bound by the terms of an executory 
contract, much less by a forum selection clause within the same executory 
instrument."). The trial court properly granted Innerlight Summary Judgment on 
this issue. 
3. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Condition 
Precedent was not "Fulfilled." 
Recognizing that it supplied no company price list, a condition that 
Innerlight mandated in writing under paragraph 2(b), Matrix asks this Court to 
ignore the intent and expectations of the parties expressed in the Agreement, and 
to conclude that Innerlight satisfied the condition precedent for an overall contract 
on its own through Innerlight's limited-quantity, one-time purchase orders. 
Matrix's argument fails for several alternative reasons. 
First, Matrix's failure to challenge dispositive trial court rulings dooms 
Matrix's theory, as shown above. Matrix's "fulfillment" theory is fatally 
dependant on "evidence" precluded by contract and the UCC pursuant to the 
6
 Again, Matrix's entire argument should be rejected because it fails to comply 
with rule 24 Utah R. App. P. Matrix makes no effort to supply this Court with 
substantive authority and to apply it. 
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unchallenged trial court rulings; it is precluded by the unchallenged rulings that 
bar the use of purchase order pricing under the statute of frauds of UCC §2-
202(1); and it collides with the trial court's unchallenged no-contract ruling under 
UCC §2-305(4). See pp. 13-15 supra. Matrix's "fulfillment" argument ends here. 
Second, and alternatively, the Agreement's integration clause precludes 
Matrix's argument under the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Tangren v. 
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, <[ 11, — P.3d — (quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & 
Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)), because Matrix's theory is 
dependant on alleged pre-Agreement oral understandings on price, information 
beyond the Agreement's four corners. See Matrix Brief at pp. 22-33. 
In the Agreement, the parties set forth that: 
This agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the 
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may 
not be amended or modified except by a written instrument 
signed by each of the parties hereto. . . . No party shall be 
construed as having waived any of its rights hereunder 
unless such waiver shall be in writing signed by the party 
against whom such waiver is being sought. Neither the 
failure of any party to exercise any power given such party 
hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by any other 
party with its obligations hereunder, nor any custom or 
practice of the parties at variance with the terms hereof, 
shall constitute a waiver of any party's right to demand 
exact-compliance with the terms hereof. . . . No 
representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral 
or otherwise, between the parties not embodied herein or 
incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or 
effect. 
Addendum B, TJ 12. This integration provision eliminates any consideration 
of an alleged prior agreement on pricing ("oral or otherwise"), and any reliance 
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upon such an agreement would be an error of law. See Tangren, 2008 UT 20, f 
11. "In other words, regardless of whether the parties may have had preliminary 
agreements about a given subject during the course of negotiations, we will 
assume that a writing dealing with the same subject was intended by the parties to 
supersede any prior or contemporaneous agreements." Novell Inc.'v. The Canopy 
Group, 2004 UT App 162, U 14, 92 P.3d 768. Because Matrix's argument 
assumes that it produced pricing information to Innerlight prior to the execution of 
the Agreement, its argument violates the parties' integration provision, which 
eliminates Matrix's fulfillment theory from consideration here. 
Third, even if the Agreement's integration term did not preclude Matrix's 
"evidence" (and it does), Matrix had no admissible evidence of an alleged oral 
understanding on pricing. Matrix cites the Catinella affidavit as its proof. See, 
e.g., Matrix Brief at 20. But the trial court struck the cited portions of the 
Catinella Affidavit from consideration based on Innerlight's unopposed motion to 
strike. See pp. 39-41, infra. 
Fourth, the Innerlight purchase orders are insufficient as a matter of law to 
constitute an "acceptance" for overall contract pricing, as the trial court correctly 
ruled. (R. 886.) Matrix produced no admissible evidence that it supplied a 
company price list that any Innerlight purchase order could accept. And even if 
there were a fixed Matrix company price list capable of acceptance, the purchase 
orders on their face do not purport to "accept" anything; they place a one-time 
order for a specified, limited quantity of product. (R. 887.) They do not state that 
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they "accept" or approve pricing for years of purchases of unknown quantities of 
product, contrary to what Matrix implies. They contain no reference to any price 
list, to paragraph 2(b), or any other Agreement term. (R. 186.) Indeed, the section 
of the purchase orders entitled "Terms," states that there are "none." (Id.) 
The trial court also ruled that, at most, the purchase orders represented a 
limited contract between Innerlight and Matrix for the purchase of a discrete 
amount of product at a defined purchase price. (R. 884-87.) Because Innerlight 
already paid for its one-time order, the purchase order was fully performed and 
inapplicable to the Agreement. (R. 887.) Matrix does not challenge these rulings 
on appeal. Thus, any claim of error is abandoned on appeal. (R. 887.) See Am. 
Towers Owners Assoc, Inc., 930 P.2d at 1185 n. 5. In sum, the trial court 
correctly ruled that the Innerlight purchase orders as a matter of law did not create 
pricing for an overall contract. (R. 886-87.) 
Fifth, conditions precedent are subject to strict rules of interpretation and 
the parties are bound by the terms that they adopted in the Agreement. See 
Clayton, 863 P.2d at 38. Matrix failed to produce a Product Price List, and 
Innerlight supplied no written acceptance of a Matrix Product Price List. Matrix's 
effort to inject precluded evidence of conduct not contemplated under the 
condition precedent should be rejected, and the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
Matrix receives no help from Monroe Inc. v. Jack Parsons Construction 
Co., 604 P.2d 901 (Utah 1979), which it cites "by analogy" for the notion that 
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"any signed writing" (presumably even a purchase order) could meet the 
requirement of paragraph 2(b) of a written acceptance. See Matrix Brief at 22. 
Even if this is so, as shown above, Matrix adduced no admissible evidence that it 
supplied a company price list that a purchase order could accept in writing or 
otherwise, and the purchase orders, as a matter of law, do not operate as an 
"acceptance" of any term or price list, as shown above. In all events, Matrix's 
failure to challenge dispositive trial court rulings precludes Matrix's fulfillment 
theory. 
In sum, for the above alternative reasons, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's ruling that the material condition precedent of paragraph 2(b) was 
unsatisfied, leaving the Agreement unenforceable. (R. 883-84.) 
7
 Monroe is inapplicable on other levels. Unlike this case, the parties in Monroe 
entered an enforceable, complete contract already containing agreed pricing. See 
id. at 902. They orally agreed to modify the contract, including price terms, and 
confirmed this in writing. See id. at 903. After the plaintiff folly performed under 
the contract—not submitted and paid for just one order—the defendant rejected the 
modified terms, arguing the oral modification was barred by the UCC and the 
contract's integration and modification provisions. See id. at 904-05. The court 
disagreed, holding that the letter confirming the modification, coupled with the 
defendant's notice to its client, satisfied the UCC. See id. at 904-06. The court 
also determined, unlike the Agreement here, that the parties' "modification" 
provision was insufficient to establish the parties' intent. See id. at 904-05. The 
Monroe court implied that a no-modification provision as detailed as Agreement 
paragraph 12, would be enforceable. See id. Because the Agreement's paragraph 
12 here (Addendum B) contains such a comprehensive no-modification provision, 
under Monroe, any modification to the Agreement must be accomplished within a 
single writing, signed by both parties. No such writing exists here. Further, the 
purchase order made no mention of the Agreement or its terms and contains no 
language suggesting that it was intended to modify the Agreement. 
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That Innerlight Did Not 
Ratify The Agreement To Excuse The Condition Precedent 
Matrix asserts that Innerlight ratified the contract "by reaping the contract's 
benefits for a year and a half." Matrix's Brief, at p.26. And Matrix cites the same 
evidence of Innerlight's one-time product purchase, its steps to promote product 
and statements of Innerlight's parent company. See Matrix brief at pp. 26-31. The 
trial court determination that Innerlight did not ratify the parties' Agreement 
should be affirmed for multiple alternative reasons. 
First, as with Matrix's fulfillment theory, Matrix's failure to challenge 
dispositive trial court rulings precludes Matrix's ratification claim. Matrix's 
theory is fatally reliant on the same course-of-performance "evidence" precluded 
by contract and the UCC pursuant to unchallenged trial court rulings; it is 
precluded by unchallenged rulings barring use of purchase order pricing under the 
statute of frauds of UCC §2-202(1); and it is precluded by the trial court's 
unchallenged no-contract ruling under UCC §2-305(4). See pp. 13-15, supra. 
Matrix's "fulfillment" argument ends here. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988 
P.2d 1 (the appellant "has waived any challenge to this ruling by failing to raise, 
brief, or argue the issue"). 
Second, the trial court ruled that "ratification" is an affirmative defense that 
Matrix failed to plead and preserve. (R. 890.) The court ruled that Matrix could 
not assert the theory because it had waived it under rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 890) Matrix does not challenge this ruling on appeal (or even 
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advise this Court that the ruling occurred), and has thus abandoned any claim of 
error associated with the trial court ruling. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988 
P.2d 1. Accordingly, Matrix's ratification argument may be rejected as a matter of 
law.8 
Third, even if Matrix's ratification claim were not otherwise'precluded (and 
it is), the trial court properly concluded that no "ratification" occurred sufficient to 
excuse or satisfy the condition precedent of paragraph 2(b). Ratification may be 
either implied or express, see Lowe v. April Indus,, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(Utah 1974), but in either case, "to be effectual, [the decision to ratify] must have 
been made with a full knowledge of all material facts." Aggeller & Musser Seed 
Co. v. Blood, 73 Utah 120, 272 P. 933, 936 (1928). In its attempt to establish a 
ratification, Matrix again advances the same course-of-performance evidence 
(precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings (R. 890-92)), saying Innerlight was 
"acting on the contract for more than a year and a half by signing the Agreement, 
placing one order of 5 products, posting a price list for resale on its web site, 
allowing Matrix to invite Beverly Sassoon to two events, and forward-looking 
statements of an Innerlight parent company. See Matrix Brief at 27-28.9 But 
8
 In an abundance of caution, Innerlight addresses Matrix's ratification argument 
on appeal. However, Innerlight maintains that the argument presented cannot 
affect the outcome of the appeal due to Matrix's tacit acceptance of the trial 
court's ruling. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ^ 54, 48 P.3d 895. 
9
 Matrix also devotes pages to conjecture (without authority), asserting, for 
example, that Innerlight's "parent company" "took several legally operative and 
significant steps" by filing required 8Q and 10K forms (but never explaining what 
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Matrix ignores the legal reality that for Innerlight to have "ratified" the 
Agreement, Innerlight had to confirm its "acceptance" of the enforceability of the 
Agreement by fully performing under its terms through, among other points of 
performance, making mandatory quarterly payments and purchases. See 
Addendum B, ^ 5. Thus, had Innerlight performed for "a year and a half," as 
Matrix implies, Innerlight would have made required payments to Matrix of at 
least $750,000 just during the first year of the Agreement. See id. During the 
second year, Innerlight would have paid $1.5 million for products. See id. 
However, it is undisputed that Innerlight did not make these payments, submitting 
and purchasing instead just one order just after the execution of the Agreement. 
(R. 880-881.) Matrix's selective view on performance under the Agreement falls 
short of the proof required for ratification. See, e.g., Yturria v. Kerr-McGee Oil & 
Gas Onshore, LP, No. 7:05-cv-181, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80942, *49 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 6, 2006) (noting that the elements of ratification are (1) "approval by act, 
was legally operative or why it matters) (Matrix Brief at 28 (emphasis supplied)); 
saying that it uis inconceivable" that a public company (Quigley, not Innerlight) 
would announce that Innerlight was selling Sassoon products if Quigley thought 
Innerlight had no contract (overlooking that it is typical of parties in UCC 2-
305(4) cases to begin performing—even to the point of buying and selling product-
-before the price dispute surfaced, (see R. 895-96); and saying that Innerlight 
would have no right to utilize Beverly Sassoon if there were no overall contract 
(overlooking that Matrix, in fact, arranged the first Sassoon visit even before the 
Agreement was signed, and that Matrix could refuse to produce Ms. Sassoon, and 
could even refuse to ship product, until Matrix had supplied a company price list 
and received Innerlight's written acceptance). (Matrix Brief 29; Agreement *j[ 
2(b)). 
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word, or conduct; (2) with full knowledge of the facts of the earlier act; and (3) 
with the intention of giving validity to the earlier act"). 
Swan Creek Village Homeowners Association v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 
P.3d 1122, does not change this. There, the court ruled that the authority of a 
home owners association had been ratified by its membership based "on the fact 
that the [association] has acted as a valid association for almost twenty years, 
during which time the lot owners have collectively accepted its management." Id. 
at f 38 (emphasis supplied). The differences between Warne and this case are 
stark. Unlike the association membership in Warne, Innerlight did not accept or 
meet the performance requirements of the Agreement (i.e., it did not attempt to 
make required payments). (R. 880.) Further, Innerlight made a single purchase 
based on prices it proposed. (R. 880.) And most importantly, Innerlight did not 
submit dozens of orders or routinely perform any other duty for almost "twenty 
years." Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122, f 38. As a matter of law, even if 
Matrix had preserved a ratification claim, and its evidence were not barred (R. 
890-92), Innerlight's conduct does not suggest that it intended to ratify the 
Agreement. 
Fourth, even if Innerlight were found to have "ratified" the Agreement, 
Matrix is, in effect, asserting that Innerlight accepted the terms of the Agreement 
which still include the express condition precedent of paragraph 2(b). There is no 
other "contract" and Matrix cannot selectively cull out terms it dislikes, as the trial 
court correctly ruled. (R. 891.) Thus, even if accepted, Matrix's argument results 
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only in a determination that Innerlight agreed to the terms of the executory 
agreement, an agreement that never became an enforceable contract due to the 
failure of the condition precedent. See Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Quigley, 
899 P.2d 766, 775 (Utah 1995) (Zimmerman, J. concurring and dissenting) 
(stating that the executory agreement, even it ratified, ucontemplate[d] a separate 
writing"). Matrix's ratification theory ends where it began. 
For the above alternative reasons, the trial court's ruling, denying Matrix's 
ratification claim on summary judgment, should be affirmed. 
C Innerlight Did Not Waive its Right to Insist Upon Strict 
Compliance With the Terms of the Executory Agreement 
The trial court correctly concluded that Innerlight had not waived its right 
to demand strict compliance with the terms of the Agreement and that it had not 
somehow abrogated the plain language of the Agreement through its actions. Like 
Matrix's fulfillment and ratification theories, Matrix's waiver claim fails on 
multiple alternative grounds. 
First, Matrix's waiver theory is precluded by unchallenged trial court 
rulings that: (a) Matrix's evidence on waiver (Matrix's "twelve undisputed 
actions" (Matrix Brief at 24-25)) is precluded from consideration under 
Agreement paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 (R. 887-90); (b) Innerlight could not 
waive rights under the Agreement without an express written Innerlight waiver, 
and Innerlight provided no written waiver (R. 881, 887); (c) even if Matrix could 
have shown an Innerlight waiver under paragraph 2(b), Innerlight properly 
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revoked the waiver under UCC § 2-209(5) (R. 889); (d) Matrix's attempted use of 
purchase order pricing to create an overall contract is barred under the statute of 
frauds of UCC §2-201(1) (R. 889); and (e) the parties had no "contract" under 
UCC §2-305(4) (R. 895-96). Because Matrix assigns no error on appeal regarding 
these rulings and does not brief them, any claim concerning them is waived. 
Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, j^ 21 (the appellant "has waived any challenge to this 
ruling by failing to raise, brief, or argue the issue"). The trial court's unchallenged 
rulings defeat Matrix's waiver theory. The Court's analysis may end here. 
Second, even if Matrix's waiver theory were not precluded as shown above 
(and it is), Matrix failed as a matter of law to establish that Innerlight "distinctly" 
and "unequivocally" waived its rights under the Agreement. The parties agreed 
that, to be effective, a waiver must be evidenced by a signed writing, and that no 
course of conduct could deprive a party of the right to insist on strict compliance 
with Agreement terms. Addendum B, ^ 12. Though Matrix may dislike this 
provision, courts "will not make a better contract for the parties than they have 
made for themselves," and that courts will refuse to "avoid the contract's plain 
language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, 
2002 UT 62, *! 19; see also Fair bourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Housing Partners, 
Inc., 2003 UT App 98, n.l, 68 P.3d 1038 (refusing to read terms into or out of a 
contract, when the parties had negotiated the contract and agreed upon the terms). 
Matrix attempts to deal with the "anti-waiver" provisions of paragraph 12 
saying, conveniently, that Innerlight waived them too. See Matrix Brief at 24. 
29 
SLC 180629.1 
According to Matrix, the same "laundry list" of evidence somehow mixed to 
waive the agreed-to anti-waiver provision. Id. But wavier of an anti-waiver 
clause should only occur when the parties conduct is "so pervasive" as to waive 
the clause. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 874 (10th Cir. 
1981) (denying summary judgment on claim that waiver had been made because 
the conduct was not "so pervasive"); see also United Vaccines, Inc. v. Diamond 
Animal Health, Inc., No. 05-C-604-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39056, at *34-35 
(D. Wis. June 12, 2006) (finding no evidence that the party intended to waive a 
"waivers-must-be-in-writing" clause); General Grocer Co. v. Bachar, 51 111. App. 
- j ayu / , yiz (III: App. Ct. 1977) (declining to interpret plaintiffs conduct in 
accepting tardy payments "whether such instances are many or few" as waiving 
contract rights where anti-waiver clause required written waiver); PC Com v. 
Proteon, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) {citing 1 WHITE AND 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 4th Ed. § § 1-6, p. 41-42).10 Cf. Van 
Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1374 (Ind.App.1980) ("[T]he bank's conduct 
in accepting fifty-seven past due payments and thirty-seven delinquent payments 
spoke louder than its word. The trial court was adequately justified to conclude 
that the bank had waived timely payments."). 
10
 "Remember the parties may . . . provide that no waiver shall bind unless in 
writing. This clause itself may be waived, but courts should be slow to find waiver 
of anti-waiver provisions. When parties agree in writing that no waiver or 
modification shall be binding unless in writing, the one seeking a modification 
should get it in writing." 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
4th Ed. § § 1-6, p. 41-42 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Here, neither the one-time Innerlight purchase orders nor any of Matrix's 
"12 actions" mentions or even hints at the language of paragraph 12 or Innerlight's 
intent to waive that specific provision. There is no evidence—anywhere-
establishing that Innerlight intended to relinquish its right to require a written 
waiver or the right to insist on strict performance, as paragraph 12 provides. 
Matrix's evidence of waiver fails as a matter of law, as the trial court correctly 
ruled. (R. 888.) 
But even if the anti-waiver terms of paragraph 12 did not exist, and even if 
Matrix's waiver theory did not otherwise fail for the alternative reasons shown 
above, Matrix still could not meet the high standard of proof for such claims. In 
Utah, a waiver of contract rights is no small matter; "[a] waiver is an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 
935, 942 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). "To constitute a waiver, these must be 
an existing right, benefit, or advantage, knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it:' Hertz v. NORDIC Ltd., Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah 
1988) (emphasis supplied). To prove waiver, "one's actions or conduct must be 
distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and 
must be inconsistent with any other intent." Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 
(Utah 1983) (emphasis supplied). A "waiver [will ] not be tound trom any 
particular set of facts unless clearly intended." Soter's Inc, 857 P.2d at 940. 
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Under these standards, Matrix does not, and cannot, identify where 
Innerlight "clearly" manifested its intent to waive the anti-waiver terms of 
paragraph 12, much less its right to accept an agreed price list in writing before 
agreeing to be bound to an overall contract. The only direct proof of Innerlight's 
intent came from Innerlight. See (R. 188) (Innerlight's COO confirming that: 
"Innerlight has never intended to waive its rights under the Agreement"). Matrix, 
by contrast, spreads out and mixes various documents and statements (Matrix's 
"12 actions") and asks this Court to divine Innerlight's intent. See Matrix Brief at 
26. But upon scrutiny, the cited "actions" really involve only 4 facts, not 12, and 
none refers to or deals with paragraph 2(b) or otherwise "clearly" establishes 
Innerlight's intent to waive anything. In brief, the actions implicated in Matrix's 
argument include: (1) Innerlight's one-time order (which Matrix breaks out into 
multiple "facts" (the order, invoice and payment) as though they were multiple 
orders); (2) Ms. Beverly Sassoon's appearance (which Matrix dices into detailed 
sub-facts (i.e., flight plan, hotel, etc.), and which was first arranged before 
Innerlight entered the Agreement or made any order, and which Matrix could have 
denied until the condition of paragraph 2(b) was met); (3) statements issued by 
Quigley Corporation (which Matrix again breaks into sub-facts); and (4) 
information posted on Innerlight's web site (broken out again by Matrix to create 
multiple "facts"). See Matrix Brief at 24-26. 
Matrix's "12 actions" do not approach the demanding "distinctly-made" 
standard necessary to demonstrate that Innerlight intended to relinquish a right, as 
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required in Utah. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 312 
(1936) (cited approvingly in Soter's* 857 P.2d at 942). The Utah Supreme Court 
defined "distinctly" as "not confusedly, without a blending or merging of one 
thing with another, clearly, obviously, unequivocally, decidedly." Soter's, 857 
P.2d at 941 (citations omitted). Matrix's "12 actions" fail on all levels to show 
"distinctly," "without blending," and "clearly" that Innerlight intended to 
relinquish its entitlement to insist on precise performance under paragraphs 2(b) 
and 12 of the Agreement. Even in the light most favorable to Matrix, as a matter 
of law, this evidence creates no waiver of Innerlight's rights under paragraph 2(b), 
as the trial court correctly ruled. (R. 888-89.) See Parks v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 
673 P.2d 590, 605 (Utah 1983) (finding no waiver of a right to an estate even 
though party acquiesced in distribution of the estate and made no claims thereon 
for three years); Pencro Assocs. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. 04-2549-JWL, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31117, at * 38 (W.D. Kansas May 15, 2006) (holding that an e-
mail was not a written waiver when it did not specifically discuss the term sought 
to be waived); see also Vandalia P'ship. v. JLTMobil Bldg. Ltd P'ship., No. C3-
99-1723, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 403, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. April 25, 2000) 
(holding that a letter did not waive a late-fees provision in a lease when it did not 
specifically mention late fees). 
Finally, even if Matrix could show—under any combination of facts-that 
Innerlight specifically and unequivocally intended to waive paragraphs 2(b) ami 
12 of the Agreement (and it cannot), the trial court ruled that Innerlight revoked 
33 
SLCJ 80629 I 
any waiver. (R. 889.) Matrix does not challenge, brief, or even acknowledge this 
ruling and it is therefore deemed established. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, T{ 21. 
In sum, based on any or all of these alternative grounds, Matrix's waiver 
theory fails as a matter of law. 
D. Matrix's Estoppel Claim is Precluded and Fails for Lack of 
Evidence of Reliance on Innerlight Conduct 
The trial court rejected Matrix's effort to bypass the condition precedent of 
paragraph 2(b) under an estoppel theory. This ruling may be affirmed on multiple 
alternative grounds. 
First, Matrix's estoppel theory is precluded by unchallenged trial court 
rulings that: (a) Matrix's evidence on estoppel (Matrix's same "twelve actions" 
(Matrix Brief at 32)) is precluded from consideration under Agreement paragraph 
12 and UCC § 2-208 (R. 887-90); (b) even if Matrix had evidence of reliance on 
any of Innerlight's conduct, Matrix's reliance would be unreasonable as a matter 
of law (R. 893); (c) Matrix's attempted use of purchase order pricing to create an 
overall contract under an estoppel theory is barred under the statute of frauds of 
UCC §2-201(1); and (d) the parties had no "contract" under UCC §2-305(4). 
Because Matrix assigns no error on appeal to these rulings, and does not brief 
them, any claim concerning them is waived. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, % 21; 
Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997) (holding 
that issues not specifically raised and argued are deemed abandoned). This signals 
an end to Matrix's estoppel theory on appeal. 
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Second, even if Matrix's estoppel theory were not precluded and could be 
addressed on the merits on appeal, it fails as a matter of law because Matrix 
adduced no evidence that it relied on Innerlight's conduct or actions. '"The 
elements of equitable estoppel are: "conduct by one party which leads another 
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.'"" Hertz v. 
NORDIC Ltd., Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted, 
emphasis supplied). It is a "doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their 
rights where their actions or conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert 
those rights." Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court correctly rejected Matrix's estoppel claim, ruling that Matrix 
presented no evidence that it had relied upon any of Innerlight's actions or conduct 
to its detriment. (R. 892-94.) Matrix confirms this on appeal; while it alleges that 
"Innerlight's conduct... led Matrix, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action" (Matrix Brief at 32), Matrix cites no evidence to support this assertion. Id. 
And no evidence exists. None of Matrix's affidavits alleges reliance on 
Innerlight's actions. And it is insufficient to allege, as Matrix does, that "[b]y 
granting the exclusive Beverly Sassoon distribution rights to Innerlight, Matrix 
forwent offering the exclusive distributorship to another company." (R. 408, \ 8.) 
Matrix's alleged reliance upon its own participation in the Agreement is not proof 
of reliance on innerlight's "conduct," (Matrix's "12 actions"), which Matrix was 
required to establish as an element of an estoppel claim. See Hertz, 761 P.2d at 
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962. In sum, Matrix's failure to adduce evidence of reliance is fatal to its estoppel 
theory, as the trial court correctly ruled. (R. 892). 
Third, even if Matrix had adduced evidence of reliance on Innerlight's 
conduct (and it did not), the trial court ruled that Matrix's reliance would have 
been unreasonable as a matter of law. (R. 893.) See Wardley Corp. v. Meredith 
Corp., No. 03-4021, 93 Fed. Appx. 183, 186 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 2004) 
(unpublished opinion) (applying Utah law) (holding no reasonable reliance on oral 
promises not to sell trademark when contract did not disallow such a sale). Matrix 
does not challenge this ruling, which should result in the ruling being considered 
binding. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \2\. 
Finally, estoppel, like ratification, is an equitable doctrine, and although 
"'equity regards as done that which ought to be done' [it] does not apply to every 
executory contract," but instead, "[i]t only operates in favor of a party 'who holds 
the equitable right to have the act performed, as against one whom the duty of 
such performance has devolved.'" WillardPease Oil & Gas Co. v. Quigley, 899 
P.2d 766, 775 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). "A court in equity will generally 
not assist one in extricating himself from circumstances which he has created." 
Battistone v. Am. Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980). "Thus the 
argument that 'equity should consider performed a condition [the party seeking 
equity] had the option of performing' is without merit." Utah Coal & Lumber 
Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, f 12, 40 P.3d 581 
(quoting Quigley, 899 P.2d at 772). 
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These principles of equity preclude each of Matrix's equitable theories, 
including its estoppel claim. Matrix invokes equity, but does not reconcile its 
failure to perform by producing a company price list that Innerlight could then 
review and accept. Addendum B, f 2(b); (R. 880.) Matrix, not Innerlight, failed 
to satisfy the condition precedent. Matrix cannot now ask this Court to overlook 
Matrix's failure and to deprive Innerlight of its agreed-to rights under the 
Agreement based on a situation Matrix created through its own failure. Equity is 
not designed to permit such remedies. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 
I00,1f 12. 
Accordingly, based on the above multiple alternative grounds, including 
Matrix's failure to challenge dispositive trial court rulings, this Court should 
summarily reject Matrix's estoppel claim. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE PROPER 
AND WITHIN ITS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION 
While the trial court is not the sole arbiter of admissibility, it has broad 
discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its decisions 
here on two of the parties' affidavits were solidly within the bounds of that 
considerable discretion. "An affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence." Norton v. 
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 
Inadmissible evidence "cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment." 
D&L Supply v. SaurinU 115 P.2d 420, 420 (Utah 1989). The '"district court has 
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broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will 
only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2005 
UT 68,1f 27, 123 P.3d 416 (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 
96, H 20, 989 P.2d 52). 
Matrix asserts two evidentiary errors concerning the trial court's treatment 
of the respective affidavits. First, it argues that the trial court erred in admitting a 
portion of the affidavit of Innerlight's then Executive Vice president and Chief 
Operating Officer, Wesley Tate ("Tate"). Second, Matrix asserts that the court 
erred in excluding sections of the third Affidavit of Matrix's principal, Anthony 
Catinella ("Catinella"). However, as shown below, the trial court's rulings should 
be affirmed because Matrix's argument fails to comply with Court rules and, 
alternatively, fails on the merits. 
A, Matrix's Challenge to the Trial Court's Rulings on Affidavits 
Fails to Comply with Rule 24 
The Court should reject Matrix's challenge of the trial court's affidavit 
rulings because Matrix fails to comply with rule 24, Utah R. App. P. Under rule 
24, an appellant is required to cite and apply relevant authority (see Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9)), and to cite or attach to its brief the ruling being appealed. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1)(C). Matrix's argument fails to satisfy either requirement. In 
effect, Matrix fails to explain the alleged error of the trial court, or to demonstrate 
the nature of the error with applicable authority. Instead, Matrix presents this 
Court with nothing more than undeveloped argument unsupported by any 
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authority that could assist in developing Matrix's claims. It is insufficient simply 
for Matrix to cite rules 801 and 802, Utah R. Evid., without also presenting 
authority interpreting these rules. At best, Matrix's arguments are self-serving 
assertion, unsupported by any material analysis. 
Matrix's argument also suffers additional deficiencies. Matrix fails to cite 
where in the record the challenged orders are found, and it fails to attach a copy of 
these orders to its brief. In failing to meet these basic rule 24 requirements, Matrix 
has "cdump[ed] the burden of argument and research'" on this Court, which 
should result in the rejection of Matrix's argument. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 
f 13, 99 P.3d 820 (citation omitted). 
R, The Trial Court Correctly Ruled on the Tate Affidavit 
The trial court exercised proper discretion in admitting Wesley Tate's 
Affidavit. Matrix challenged paragraph thirteen of Tate's affidavit as improper 
hearsay. In paragraph thirteen Tate testified that 
Following the sale of certain Sassoon products purchased 
from Matrix, Innerlight received complaints from 
customers including, that a facial product caused 
"burning" to the customer's skin, that a lotion was 
"runny," and that lotion pumps were inoperable. 
(R. 191, \ 13.) Matrix does not question that Innerlight received the complaints. 
And Matrix tacitly concedes that Tate's statements about the complaints are the 
product of his personal knowledge and thus proper under rule 56(e). Matrix's 
chief complaint instead appears to center on contextual aspects of Tate's 
testimony. But Matrix fails to recognize that these contextual aspects were not 
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offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted" (Utah R. Evid. 801(c)), but to 
support Tate's assertion that Innerlight had "received complaints." Courts 
regularly admit the content of customer complaints when the complaints merely 
support their existence. See Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 346 
(1st Cir. 1998); Bowen v. Fed Express Corp., No. CA 3:98-CV-1417-R, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1697, ** 12-13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2000). 
Matrix does not question this authority. And consistent with such rulings, 
the trial court properly denied Matrix's Motion to Strike. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Struck Sections of the Late-Filed 
Catinella Affidavit 
The trial court's ruling, striking portions to Catinella's Third Affidavit (R. 
720), was correct and should be affirmed based on alternative grounds. First, it 
was proper to grant Innerlight's Motion to Strike because Matrix did not oppose it. 
(R. 800: 3-4, 878).M See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 938 P.2d 282, 283 n.l (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (noting that the failure to oppose a motion before the trial court results 
in the waiver of the right to challenge the decision). 
Second, and alternatively, the Catinella affidavit was properly stricken 
because it was untimely. This Court recently noted that untimely affidavits and 
untimely evidence are subject to exclusion "even if the results lead to a grant of 
11
 Matrix submitted all motions for decision without arguing against Innerlight's 
motion to strike. (R. 800: 40.) Matrix filed an untimely opposition to Innerlight's 
motion the day after the motion was decided. (R. 798.) 
Counsel for Innerlight raised this issue before the trial court during oral 
argument (R. 800: 3-4.) 
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summary judgment against the party seeking its introduction." Sunridge Dev. 
Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g Inc., 2008 UT App 29, n.4, 596 Utah Adv. 30. Matrix filed 
Catinella's Third Affidavit as an attachment to its Reply memorandum in support 
of its motion for summary judgment. (R. 720.) The affidavit, at least in part, 
purported to address a new argument that Matrix first attempted to raise in its 
reply memorandum after Innerlight's briefing had closed, precluding Innerlight 
from responding.13 Thus, the trial court's decision to exclude portions of 
Catinella's untimely affidavit was solidly within the bounds of the court's 
discretion. See id. 
Third, even if the challenged sections of Catinella's affidavit were not 
otherwise properly stricken (and they were), they were riddled with inadmissible 
material, unsuitable for consideration. Under rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P, an 
affidavit must be based upon personal knowledge, must have an adequate 
foundation in the record, must avoid conclusory statements, and must not rely 
upon hearsay. See In re the Gen. Determination of Water Rights, 1999 UT 39, f^ f 
26-27, 982 P.2d 65; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Failure to satisfy these 
requirements renders an affidavit, or at least its offending portions, inadmissible. 
See Norton, 669 P.2d at 859. 
Matrix raised a "practical construction" theory for the first time in its reply 
memo after Innerlight's briefing had closed; consequently, the trial court ruled that 
"the Court need not consider it." (R. 894.) Matrix does not challenge the trial 
court's ruling on appeal. 
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Catinella's Third Affidavit failed to comport with rule 56(e). Catinella 
purported that Matrix and Innerlight "entered into an Exclusive Distributorship 
Agreement whereby [Innerlight] was appointed as the exclusive distributor" of 
certain products. (R. 721, U 3.) He also asserted that he and the principals of 
Innerlight "jointly, cooperatively, and with finality agreed upon the prices at 
which [Innerlight] would sell" the product. (R. 722, ^ 8.) Each of these 
statements violates the requirements of rule 56(e) because they are legal 
conclusions (regarding when an "agreement" is formed and how it operates) and 
neither represents Catinella's personal knowledge. Rather, the statements are 
better described as "factual conclusions," which are "insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of fact." Winter v. N. W. Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991). 
The statements purport to speak to the intent of individuals not within Catinella's 
control, and he has conflated his opinion of what occurred between himself and 
Innerlight's principals into a legal conclusion (that the parties entered a contractual 
and how that contract functioned) cloaked as a factual assertion. Thus, the trial 
court properly excluded paragraphs three and eight. 
Similarly, the trial court properly excluded paragraph nine and paragraphs 
ten through fourteen of the affidavit. In paragraph nine, Catinella contended that 
the prices Innerlight paid for its one-time order matched prices he said the parties 
"agreed upon." (R. 722, \ 9.) This assertion was again not based upon Catinella's 
personal knowledge, but was instead another legal conclusion concerning the one-
time transaction. Such material is inadmissible because it is conclusory, purports 
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to be factual but is instead legal opinion, and lacks foundation. Thus, the trial 
court properly declined to consider it. Saurini, 775 P.2d at 420 (stating that it is 
error to consider inadmissible evidence in a summary judgment proceeding). 
In paragraphs ten through fourteen, Catinella made the same error. He 
describes Innerlight as "the then-exclusive distributor . . . pursuant to the contract" 
(R. 722, If 10), asserts that "because of the exclusivity given to [Innerlight] under 
the contract," Matrix sold product to no other distributor (R. 722, Tf 11), and claims 
that Innerlight made demands pursuant to the alleged contract. (R. 723, ffif 12-
14.). These allegations, like others in his Affidavit, are no more than conclusions 
or aspirations packaged as "facts." They are merely Catinella's opinions 
concerning the nature of the parties5 executory agreement and his legal conclusion 
that the agreement ripened into an enforceable contract prior to the satisfaction of 
the condition precedent. At bottom, these statements are improper legal 
conclusions and opinion concerning the very question lying at the heart of 
Innerlight's Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Therefore, the trial court properly 
struck them. 
Finally, because the parties' executory agreement contained a clear 
integration provision, Catinella's effort to inject an alleged prior agreement was 
inadmissible as a matter of law. As the Utah Supreme Court recently stated, when 
parties to a contract include a clear integration provision within their written 
agreement, '"in the absence of fraud, that writing contains the whole of the 
agreement between the parties.'" Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, f 12, — P.3d-
43 
SLCJ 80629 1 
- (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972)). The 
allegations that Matrix attempted to inject into the proceedings through Catinella's 
third affidavit, not filed until after Matrix had submitted its reply memo, 
constituted an alleged prior oral agreement that would have altered the meaning of 
the parties' integrated agreement.14 Through these allegations, Matrix sought to 
. evade the effect of the Agreement's condition precedent. The Agreement 
specified that it would become an enforceable contract only after Matrix supplied 
a Product Price List and only after Innerlight accepted the list in writing. 
Addendum B, f^ 2(b). Catinella's conclusions were no more than an effort to vary 
the integrated terms of the parties' executory agreement and, thus, inadmissible. 
In sum, based upon these multiple alternative grounds, the trial court's 
decision to exclude sections of Catinella's Third Affidavit based upon Innerlight's 
unopposed motion to strike was proper and well within the trial court's 
considerable discretion. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
14
 The Agreement included the following language: 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties 
with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be 
amended or modified except by written instrument signed by 
each of the parties hereto. 
Addendum B If 12. This language mirrors the language at issue in 
Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, J^ 13, — P.3d — ; thus, under 
Tangren, Catinella's allegations related to prior oral agreements between 
the parties are precluded. The Agreement goes even further, stating that 
no "promises or agreements" between the parties not embodied herein or 
incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or effect. 
Addendum B, If 12; R. 879-80. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the multiple alternative grounds noted above, including Matrix's 
failures to challenge dispositive trial court rulings, Innerlight respectfully requests 
that this Court (1) affirm the trial court's grant of Innerlight's motion for summary 
judgment and the denial of Matrix's motion for summary judgment; and (2) affirm 
the trial court's rulings on the parties' motions to strike. 
• th DATED this 4in day of April 2008. 
David L. Arrington 
Thomas J. Burns 
Durham Jones & Pinegar 
Attorney for Appellee Innerlight, Inc. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT' COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INNERLIGHT, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF 
INNERLIGHT, INC.'S 
MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060400775 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Plaintiff Innerligb.t. Inc. ("lnnerlight") moved foj summary judgment on its requesl that 
the Exclusive Distributor Agreemeni (the "Agreement'5) between the parties be adjudged 
ineffective executor)' contmct and for related relief The Matrix Group, LLC ("Matrix") filed a 
] 
cross motion for summary judgment, seeking to have the Agreement adjudged enforceable and lo 
enforce the Agreement's forum-selection clause. David L. ArringLon and Matthew G. Grimmer 
appeared for Plaintiff, Innerlight. Stephen Quesenberry and Charles L. Perschon appeared for 
Defendant, Matrix. 
Having studied the parties' memoranda, the pleadings and affidavits on file and having 
heard oral argument from counsel, the Court finds, concludes and ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
I. Facts 
The following facts are undisputed, or as a matter of law there is no contradictory 
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242,252 (1986) (evidence on summary judgment is viewed "through the prism of 
the substantive evidentiary burden;" court must ask "whether a fair-minded jury could return a 
verdict for the-plaintiff on the Evidence presented."); Robinson v. lntermountain Health Care. 
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
1. Innerlight is a Delaware corporation, authorized to conduct business in Utah, with its 
principle place of business in Provo, Utah. 
2. Matrix is a Florida limited liability company, with its principle place of business in Palm 
Beach County, Florida. 
3. In October 2004, Matrix and Innerlight executed the Exclusive Distributor Agreement 
under which Matrix could, subject to the terms and provisions of the Agreement, appoint 
Innerlight an exclusive distributor and sell Innerlight certain cosmetic products bearing the 
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"Beverly Sassoon" name to InneriighL, and InneriighL, subjeci to the conditions of the 
Agreement could accept the distributorship appointment and buy Matrix's cosmetic products. 
a. The Agreement recites that "Distributor [Innerlight] desires to be the exclusive 
distributor" of the described products, and that "Company [Matrix] is willing to make 
Distributor its exclusive distributor for such purposes.. alJ in accordance with and 
pursuant to the terms and conditions more fully set forth . . . ." Agreement at ] (first 
recital )(emphasis supplied). 
b. Paragraph 2(a) also states in part that "[s]ubject to the terms and provisions set 
forth in this Agreement, Company hereby appoints Distributor as the exclusive 
distributor" of defined products. Agreement at 2. 
c. Paragraph 2(b) states: 
The acceptance of this appointment by Distributor [Innerlight] is 
conditioned upon Distributor's written acceptance of Company's 
[Matrix's] Product Price List which shall not be subject to change 
until October 17,2006. 
Id. (Emphasis supplied). 
d. Paragraph 12 states in part: 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties with 
respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended or 
modified except by a written instrument signed by each of the 
parties hereto . . . . No party shall be construed as having waived 
any of its rights hereunder unless such waiver shall be in writing 
signed by the parly against whom such waiver is being sought. 
Neither the failure of any party to exercise any power given such 
party hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by any other 
party with its obligations hereunder, nor any custom or practice of 
the parties at variance with the terms hereof, shall constitute a 
J 
waiver of any parly's right to demand exact compliance with the 
terms hereof. . . . No representations, inducements, promises or 
agreements, oral or otherwise, between the parlies not embodied 
herein or incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or 
effect. 
4. The parties5 representatives participated in several telephone conversations prior to 
October 2004, discussing potential product pricing. Prior to Octobei* 2004, Innerlight's Wesley 
Tate forwarded to Matrix's Rick Cantinella a spread sheet containing certain notions of pricing 
that Innerlight wanted to evaluate. 
5. Matrix never gave its "Company Product Price List" to Innerlight. Matrix advanced no 
admissible evidence that it had ever created a company price list. 
6. Innerlight never made a written acceptance of a Matrix company product price list. 
7. Innerlight and Matrix did not agree on overall contract pricing. 
8. On October 11, 2004, Innerlight made a single order for five cosmetic products by 
issuing one purchase order (sometimes referred to here as the "POs") for each type of product. 
The POs were sent to Matrix. 
9. Natural Bronze, LLC ("Natural Bronze"), a Florida limited liability company which is 
separate from Matrix, sent multiple invoices for the products Innerlight ordered. Matrix sent 
Innerlight one invoice for one cosmetic product. 
10. Innerlight paid for its one-time purchase, sending nine payments to Natural Bronze; no 
payments were made to Matrix. 
] 1. Innerlight's POs identify a specific, limited quantity of product. 
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12. Innerlight made efforts on line and otherwise to promote and sell the Matrix "Beverly 
Sassoon" producl through Innerlight \s distributors. 
] 3. Innerlight received complaints from customers that certain Matrix products caused 
"burning'' to the customer's skin, that a lotion was "runny", and that lotion pumps were 
inoperable. 
14. Ultimately, Innerlight notified its distributors that Innerlight would discontinue selling 
the Beverly Sassoon Product line. 
15. Innerlight brought this action, seeking among other things, a declaration that the 
Agreement was an unenforceable executory agreement. 
16. Matrix moved to dismiss this action, arguing that the Agreement was enforceable and that 
choice-of-venue terms in paragraph 12 required the action to be heard in Florida. The Court 
denied the motion to dismiss under a previous order (see Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Under Rule 12 (b) (3)). 
17. Matrix did not plead the affirmative defense of ratification and did not timely seek to 
amend its pleadings to assert the defense. 
18. Innerlight did not prepare and/or execute a writing waiving (oi even referring to) any of 
Innerlight\s rights under the Agreement. Innerlight did not intend to waive any rights under the 
Agreement. And the parties did nol enter into a written, signed amendment or modification to 
the Agreement. 
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]9. Matrix did no! reasonably rely to iLs detriment on any conduct of lnnerlight. Matrix's 
affidavits do no! allege thai Matrix relied on lnnerlighfs conduct or the conduct of lnnerlighfs 
parent company. 
20. Genuine issues of material fact preclude Matrix's motion for summary judgment. 
21. No genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment for lnnerlight. 
II. Conclusions of Law: 
Based upon the above, and lnnerlighfs other points, authorities and arguments, the Court 
concludes as follows: 
1. Paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement creates an express condition precedent. 
2. This express condition precedent is not to be ignored, weighed or helped with evidence 
regarding a course of performance or course of dealing. 
3. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement precludes any amendment or modification except by a 
written instrument signed by the parties. And the parties did not enter into a written, signed 
amendment or modification to the Agreement. 
4. Under the Agreement, both Matrix's appointment of lnnerlight as a distributor and 
lnnerlighfs acceptance of appointment, were subject to the Agreement's terms and conditions. 
Agreement paragraphs 2(a) & (b). The Agreement did no1 become an enforceable contract 
because the material condition precedent of paragraph 2(b) (lnnerlight*s written cicceptance of 
Matrix's company product price list) was not satisfied. Without the prerequisite acceptance, the 
Agreement was an unenforceable executory contract, and lnnerlighfs duties and obligations 
under the overall Agreement remained unenforceable. See e^g.. The Cantamar. L.L.C. v. 
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Champamie. 2006 UT App 321, PI 6 (Aug. 3, 2006) ("failure of a material condition precedent 
relieves the obligor of any duty to perform"), quoting Harper v. Greal Sail Lake Council. Inc.. 
1999 UT34.P14, 976 P.2d 1213. See also Brownsville Advanced Medical imagine. L.P.. v. 
Capitalwerks. LLC, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6360, (Tex. App. -Corpus Clirisli [13lh Disl.] 
2005)(unpublished opinion) (based on unmet conditions, the court denied a motion to dismiss 
grounded on a forum-selection clause, concluding: "Brownsville Imaging was not bound by the 
terms of an executory contract, much less by a forum selection clause within the same executory 
instrument.")- As a result, the forum-selection and law-selection provisions, which appear in the 
Agreement, are unenforceable. These terms are ineffective because the Agreement itself has not 
first been established. 
5. The venue terms and the minimum purchase obligations under the Agreement are not 
enforceable because the Agreement is an ineffective executory contract. 
6. MATRIX DID NOT FULFILL THE CONDITION PRECEDENT 
Matrix argued that, even though it supplied no company price list which Imierlight 
accepted in writing, the POs from Innerlight's one-time order should be considered "tantamount 
to written acceptance of Defendant *s [Matrix's] prices as required by the Agreement."1 This is 
incorrect as a matter of law for the following reasons: 
1
 Matrix also implies thai it fulfilled the paragraph 2(b) requirement that Matrix's pricing 
c%nol be subject to change." saying Matrix "never changed'' the price. This is incorrect. Matrix 
did not set an initial price, and there was never a second order and no opportunity for change if it 
had. No Matrix company price list was produced before or after Irmerlighf s order, much less 
one expressing the not-subjecl-to-change commitment required by paragraph 2(b). 
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a. Matrix's "fulfillment" theory is contrary to the terms of paragraph 2(b). The POs 
could only "fulfil J" paragraph 2(b), under Matrix's theory, if the term required Innerlight (instead 
of Matrix) to supply the price list and Matrix to make written acceptance as the condition. 
However, the Agreement requires Matrix to supply pricing which Innerlight has the right to 
accept if it approves. And Matrix never supplied company pricing for Innerlight to accept oi-
l-eject by PO or otherwise. 
b. The POs are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an "acceptance" for 
overall contract pricing. First, Matrix supplied no company price list for the POs to accept. 
Second, even if there were a fixed Matrix company price list capable of acceptance, the POs on 
their face do not purport to accept anything beyond a one-time order for a specified, limited 
quantity of product. They do not state that they "accept" or approve pricing for years of 
purchases of unknown quantities of product, contrary to what Matrix implies. They contain no 
reference to an)' price list, to paragraph 2(b), or any other Agreement term. Indeed, the section 
of the POs entitled "Terms," states that there are "none." The POs as a matter of law do not 
create pricing for an overall contract. 
c. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement and Utah's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") 
preclude Matrix's claim that the Agreement should be construed as "fulfilled" with reference to 
evidence of the parties' actions, and they preclude Matrix's claim that the POs "accept" a pre-
contract oral agreement on overall contract pricing. 
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i. Paragraph 12 and UCC 3 2-202. 
Paragraph 12 confirms that "this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the 
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended or modified except by a 
written instrument signed by each of the parties hereto." It goes on to state that u|n]o 
representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral or otherwise, between the parties not 
embodied herein or incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or effect." These 
terms bar consideration of evidence of Matrix's alleged extra-contract, oral understanding on 
overall contract pricing, which Matrix improperly raised for the first time by affidavit submitted 
with Matrix's reply memorandum after Innerlighf's briefing had closed." 
These integration terms of paragraph 12 are unambiguous and they confirm the parties' 
intent that the Agreement was the final expression of their agreement with respect to its terms. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-202"1 independently precludes 
evidence of any alleged oral pricing agreement to contradict or limit Innerlighfs rights under 
paragraph 2(b) to receive and accept in writing Matrix's company product price. 
Paragraph 12 also mandates that neither Innerlighl nor Matrix could look to evidence of 
their course of performance to interpret the Agreement. It states in part that no "custom or 
practice of the parties at variance with the terms hereof, shall constitute a waiver of any party's 
rights to demand exact compliance with the terms hereof." Under this term, regardless of 
* This evidence was also subject to InnerlighlJs motion to strike which Matrix did not 
oppose and which the court granted by separate order. 
•* Specific sections of Utah Code Ann. Section 70A (Utah's Uniform Commercial Code) 
are referred to in this order as "UCC § ." 
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]nnerlighl\s one-time use of POs, innerhght reLamed the righl to insist on cxacl compliance with 
the written-acecptance condition of paragraph 2(b) 
ii. UCC (? 2-208 "Course of Performance" 
Even absent paragraph 12, the evidence of custom and practice that Matrix raises cannot 
be considered to construe the Agreement. Under UCC § 2-208(1), a course of performance is 
relevant in determining the meaning of an agreement, kl. But foi conduct to qualify as a "course 
of performance" that may be considered, it must involve "repeated occasions for performance by 
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity foi objection by 
it." Id. "A single occasion of conduct does not fall within the language of this section." UCC § 
2-208. cmt. 4. See also 2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE sec. 2-208:5, at 300 (] 982) 
("[IJt necessarily follows that there is no course of performance when there are merely 
intermittent casual or isolated . .. performances. A single incident. . . does not constitute a 
course of dealings or performance."). Because Inneiiight made just one order of each of the five 
Sassoon products, using one PO per product, as a matter of law the POs are not a "course of 
performance'* that may be considered to construe the Agreement's pricing terms under paragraph 
2(b) 
d. UCC 3 2-201 (1) 
Alternatively, the statute of frauds applied by the UCC to sales of goods bars use of. 
Innerlight's POs from a one-time, limited-quantity order to "satisfy" the price-lisi/wrillen-
acceptance condition of paragraph 2(b) and establish a multimillion clollai overall "contract.'" 
Under UCC §2-201(1): 
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a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contracl for salt has been made 
between the parties and signed . . . . [B]ut the contract is not 
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods 
shown in such writing. 
Under this section, even if POs were a "writing sufficient" to establish a contract (and 
they are not under the Agreement's terms and UCC 2-305(4)), Matrix is precluded from 
enforcing by "action or defense" an overall "contract" because the POs only order a limited 
quantity of goods. UCC 2-201 (1) bars enforcement of the POs beyond the quantity of goods 
they ordered, and hinerlight already paid for those. Innerlight preserved this affirmative defense 
through timely amendment. 
For each of the above alternative reasons, as a matter of law. Matrix cannot establish an 
overall contract with pricing from the Innerlight POs. The condition of paragraph 2(b) was not 
"fulfilled." 
7. WAIVER: Innerlight did not waive its rights under paragraphs 2(b) and 12. 
a. Innerlight made no written waiver. 
Under paragraph 12 of the Agreement, Innerlight could not waive rights under the 
Agreement without an express written waiver by Innerlight allowing Matrix to bypass the 
condition precedent. Innerlight supplied no written waiver of any rights. Innerlight did not 
waive rights under paraigraph 2(b). the anti-waiver terms of paragraph 12, or any other terms of 
the Agreement. 
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b Innerliuhfs conduct did not waive the condition precedent 
Paragraph J2 and UCC § 2-208 independently bai Matrix's attempt to claim any 
Inneriight waiver by referring to the parties" actions, just as they barred the same evidence under 
Matrix's "fuifiJlmenl" theory. 
c. There is no evidence of intent as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, Matrix can not meet the high standard of proof for its claim as a matter of 
law. In Utah, "[a] waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a laiowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it." Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 
942 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). The aciaiowledgement of intent ensures "that waiver would 
not be found from any particular set of facts unless clearly intended." Id. at 940 (emphasis 
supplied). 
Matrix did not identify where Inneriight '''clearly" manifests its intent to waive its right 
under paragraph 2(b) to accept an agreed Matrix company price list in writing (or its intent to 
waive terms of paragraph 12) before agreeing to be bound to an overall contract. Matrix 
combines the following as evidence of Inneriight ?s waiver: (1) evidence of Inneriight "s one-time 
order; (2) evidence of Beverly Sassoon's appearances; (3) statements issued by Quigley 
l]
 Matrix could well have refused to produce Ms. Sassoon (whose initial appearance 
Matrix arranged even before the Agreement was executed), and could have refused to sell and 
ship product until Matrix had supplied its company price list to inneriight and had received 
Innerlighf s written acceptance under paragraph 2(b). 
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Corporation (an lnnerlighl parent company); and (4) information posted on Innerlight's web site. 
Even if this evidence were not barred under paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208, as a matter of law 
Matrix's evidence does not show "clearly/5 distinctly, and without blending, that' lnnerlighl 
intended to relinquish its entitlement to insist on precise performance under paragraphs 2(b) and 
12. Matrix's evidence does not refer to or deal with paragraph 2(b) or paragraph 12. Viewing 
Matrix's evidence in light most favorable to Matrix, as a matter of law it cannot meet the 
evidentiary burden to establish Innerlight's intentional relinquishment of a known right under 
paragraphs 2(b) and 12 of the Agreement. 
d. Even if waiver could be shown, lnnerlighl revoked it. 
Alternatively, even if Matrix could have shown a waiver "distinctly" and "clearly," any 
such waiver was effectively revoked within the meaning of UCC § 2-209(5) through express, 
written notice to Matrix on Decembei-12, 2005. This was reasonable notification to Matrix that 
strict performance with paragraph 2(b) was required. And, because Matrix's affidavits make no 
claim that Matrix relied on Innerlight's conduct to its detriment, the retraction would not be 
unjust as a matter of law. 
e. UCC $ 2-201 (1) (UCC Statute of Frauds') Bars Matrix's Waiver Theory 
Alternatively, even if Matrix could otherwise establish that lnnerlighl "clearly intended" to 
waive the price-lisl/wrilten-acceplanee condition of paragraph 2(b), Matrix was still required to 
establish agreed-to pricing before it could establish an overall contract. As explained above, 
Matrix's effort to establish overall contract prices based on one-time order prices culled from 
Innerlight's POs is barred by the UCC's statute of frauds (UCC § 2-201(1)). And the POs could 
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nol be enforced beyond the quantity 0/ goods they identify. Beyond this, evidence 0/ any alleged 
oral price agreement is precluded by paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-202. as explained above. 
In sum. for alternative reasons. Matrix's waiver theory is precluded and 'cannot establish 
an overall enforceable contract 01 preclude summary judgment for Jnnerlight as a matter of law. 
8. RATIFICATION: Matrix's ratification theory is waived and is inapplicable as a matter 
of law. 
a. Matrix's ratification theory is waived. 
Matrix did not affirmatively plead the defense of ratification and it is barred under rule 
"8(c). Utah R. Civ. P.. [which] requires a party to set forth 'any other matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense.5 otherwise, the defense is waived." Pratt v. Board of Educ, 
564 P.2d 294. 297 (Utah 1977) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)). While Utah courts have not 
addressed whether "ratification'*' is an affirmative defense that must be pled or waived, other 
courts have. See e ^ , Robinson v. Powell 348 N.C. 562, 566 (N.C. 1998) (citing N.C. 
equivalent to Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)) ("Ratification is an affirmative defense which must^e 
affirmatively pled."): FD1C v. Calhoun. 34 F.3d 1291. 1299 (5,h Cir. 1994) ("Likewise, while 
ratification is not one of the enumerated affirmative defenses under FED.R.CIV.P. 8(c), Texas 
law treats ratification as a defense.";: Silsbec Hosp.. Inc. v. George, ] 63 S.W.3d 284, 292 (Tex. 
App. 2005) (holding unpled ratification argument waived). Because Matrix did not plead the 
affirmative defense of ratification; it is waived. 
CM r ifM*n 1 
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b. Innerliuhl's conduct cannot be evidence of ratification. 
Paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 independently bar Matrix's attempt to support its 
ratification theory by referring to the parlies' actions, just as they barred such evidence under 
Matrix's fulfillment and waiver theories, as explained above, 
c. Ratification is inapplicable. 
Matrix's ratification theory cannot cause the Agreement to become an enforceable overall 
contract as a matter of law. Matrix rehearses the same course-of-performance evidence cited as 
support for its other theories and then just concludes that Innerlight, "by its conduct, ratified the 
Contract." But the "contract" Matrix says was ratified is the Agreement, and it still contains the 
unfulfilled condition precedent of paragraph 2(b), and it still raises the bar of paragraph 12 to the 
very "evidence" of the parties' custom or practice on which Matrix's theories depend. There is 
no other agreement. As a matter of law, Matrix cannot selectively eliminate terms from the 
Agreement simply by saying the Agreement was "ratified." 
d. Ratification is barred by UCC S$ 2-201(1) and 2-202. 
Alternatively, the UCC's statute of frauds (UCC § 2-201(1)) precludes efforts to employ 
the POs to establish pricing to enforce an overall contract under this theory as it does with 
Matrix's "waiver" or "fulfillment" theories. And the POs could not be enforced themselves 
beyond the quantity of goods they identify. Additionally, evidence of any alleged oral price 
agreement is precluded by paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-202, as explained above 
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In sum, for alternative reasons, ratification theory is waived or is inapplicable and eannol 
establish an overall enforceable contract or preclude summary judgment for lnnerlighl as a 
mattej- of law. 
9. ESTOPPEL: Matrix's estoppel theory is inapplicable as a matter of law. 
a. The evidence on which Matrix bases its theory is precluded under paragraph 12 
and UCC § 2-208. 
b. Matrix failed to meet all elements required for estoppel. Even if Matrix's 
underlying evidence of conduct were not precluded, Matrix failed adequately to allege or adduce 
evidence sufficient to establish on summary judgment that it reasonably relied on the kmerlighf s 
conduct. First Matrix adduced no evidence that it relied on Innerlight's conduct; Matrix's 
affidavits contain no allegation that Matrix relied on Innerlight's actions. Accordingly, Matrix 
failed to establish the required ^reliance" element of an estoppel claim. 
Second, even if Matrix's affidavits had alleged reliance, Matrix's reliance would be 
unreasonable as a matter of law based on the record before the Court, particularly where the 
Agreement defined where reliance could/could not be possible. "[Wjhen the alleged promises 
aire contrary to the terms of the contract, reliance on such promises would be unreasonable." 
Wardley Corp. v. Meredith Corp., No. 03-4021, 93 Fed. Appx. 183r 186 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 
2004) (unpublished opinion) (applying Utah law) (holding no reasonable reliance on oral 
promises not to sell trademark when contract did nol disallow such a sale); see also Woods v. 
NalM Med. Care. Inc., No. 01-2056., 25 Fed. Appx. 767. 772 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished 
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opinion) (holding reliance on oral promises not reasonable when parly knew of written 
agreement that contradicted the oral pi onuses) 
Matrix knew undei the Agreement that it was required to supply a company price list m a 
form that could not change foi a defined period as a condition precedent to lnnerhght's 
appointment and acceptance as a distributor. But Matrix supplied no price list. Matrix knew 
undei the Agreement that receipt of lnnerhght's written acceptance of Matrix's fixed price list 
was required to meet the condition precedent. But Matrix did not receive a written acceptance 
and did nothing about it Id. Matrix knew undei paragraph 12 of the Agreement that it could not 
rely on any oral agreement or representation (and it was disputed that such an oral "agreement'5 
occurred), or upon any evidence of the parties' custom and practice to negate Innerlight's 
express right to insist on exact compliance. Matrix could not reasonably rely on any Innerlight 
actions here because this collides directly with the express terms of the Agreement. 
This result is also confirmed by Matrix's knowledge of facts outside of the Agreement. 
Matrix knew by at least April 2005 of Innerlight's intent not to perform under an overall 
"contract" when Innerlight made none of the payments required in the second quarter or any 
subsequent quarlei under the Agreement. And Matrix was expressly reminded in December 
2005 that Innerlight had not given written acceptance of a Matrix price list, and had not accepted 
the distributorship appointment. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable as a matter of law for 
Matrix to rely on lnnerlighf s alleged conduct. 
c. Matrix's Estopple theory (like its other theories) is barred by the statute of frauds 
in UCC § 2-201 because there is no price oi quantity term for an enforceable overall contract. 
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Additionally, evidence of any alleged oral price agreemenl is precluded by paragraph 12 and 
UCC' § 2-202, as explained above. 
For alternative reasons, Matrix's estoppel theory cannot establish an overall enforceable 
contract, or preclude summary judgment for Innerlight. as a matter of law. 
] 0. Public statements made by Innerlight*'s parent company do not constitute or contradict 
Innerlight's intention, or preclude lnnerlighf's right to enforce the condition precedent in the 
Agreement. 
] ]. Innerlight did not excuse Matrix from strict compliance with the condition precedent in 
the Agreement. 
12. PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION; Matrix's practical-construction theory is barred or is . 
otherwise inapplicable as a matter of law. 
a. Matrix improperly raised this theory for the first time in its reply brief after 
Innerlight's briefing was closed, and the Court need not consider it. 
b. Matrix cites the same evidence for this claim that it cites to support its other 
theories. Howevei-. paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 preclude consideration of such evidence. 
Thus., as a matter of law. there is insufficient evidence to sustain this theory. 
c. UCC § 2-208 (entitled "Course of performance or practical construction1') 
displaces Matrix's common law practical-construction theory in this UCC sales-of-goods case. 
See UCC § 1-103 (noting thai principles of equity may supplement provisions of the UCC 
"|u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this act. . . ."J. Moreover, Matrix employs 
common-law practical-construction principies (and the principles of ail its equitable theories) to 
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supplant the UCC's provisions, not merely to "supplement'* them. And under UCC § 1-103. 
tkwhilc principles of common law and equity may supplement provisions 0/ the Uniform 
Commercial Code they may not be used to supplant its provisions." UCC § 1 -1"03, cmt. 2. 
Even if pled as required under UCC § 2-208; Matrix's practical-construction claim would 
fail because the parties did not have occasion for repeat performance. And even if occasion for 
such performance had existed. Matrix's characterization of its evidence of performance and the 
Agreement's express terms cannot be construed as consistent The Court thus concludes that the 
Agreement's express terms, including paragraphs 2(b) and 12, control under UCC § 2-208 (2). 
d. Even if Matrix's common law practical-construction theory were not otherwise 
precluded, the Court concludes that it would fail even under the elements of the authorities 
Matrix cites because paragraphs 2(bj and 12 are unambiguous. 
e. Like Matrix's other theories, the practical-construction theory still depends on, 
among other things, agreed pricing before an overall enforceable contract could exist. But 
Matrix's evidence of price is barred by the statute of frauds in UCC § 2-201 because there is no 
price or quantity term for an enforceable overall contract. And evidence of any alleged oral price 
agreement is precluded by paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-202: as explained above. 
For alternative reasons, Matrix's practical!-construction theory cannot establish an overall 
enforceable contract or preclude summary judgment foi lnnerlight as a matter of law. 
13. UCC $2-305(4) Beyond principles governing the condition precedent, lnnerlight and 
Matrix are not bound by "contract'" undei UCC § 2-305 (4) which slates: 
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Where, howevei, the parlies intend nol to he bound unless Lhc price be Ilxed or 
agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract In such a ease the buyer 
must return any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay then 
reasonable value at the Lime of delivery and the sellei must return any portion of the 
price paid on account. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-305(4) (emphasis supplied). 
Tht parties' intent is plain from the Agreement itself. The condition precedent of 
paragraph 2(b) expresses the parlies' intent that Innerlight would not be bound as a distributor 
absent its written acceptance of fixed Matrix company pricing terms. Paragraph 2(a) expresses 
the parlies' intent that Matrix would not be bound to an appointment of Innerlight as a distributor 
absent satisfaction of the Agreement's other terms which include the condition precedent of 
paragraph 2(b). Because the condition remains unsatisfied, no overall contract exists under the 
UCC. See e^ g., Quaker State Mushroom Co.. lnc v. Dominick's Friar Foods. Inc., 635 F. Supp. 
1281. 1286 (N.D.IU. 1986); Unued Foods. Inc. v Hadley-Peoples Manu. Co.. ] 994 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 277 (Tenn. App Ct. May 20., 1994) (unpublished opinion). 
14. Under UCA § 2-305(4), Innerlight is required to return to Matrix the products Innerlight 
purchased under the POs which remain within Innerlight's custody and control Matrix is 
required lo refund to Innerlight the purchase price paid to Matrix for items returned. 
20 
THEREFORE, based on the above, and Inneriight \s other arguments and authorities, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiff Innerlighl Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, 
2. Defendant The Matrix Group LLC's motion for summary judgment is DENIED, 
3. Inneriight shall within 30 days of entry of this Order ship to Matrix all Matrix Sassoon 
products in Inneriight \s possession Shipment shall be made to Matrix's address identified on 
the Inneriight POs. Matrix shall accept delivery at that location. However, if Matrix notifies 
Inneriight in writing within 5 business days after entry of this order of a different delivery 
address within the United States, Inneriight shall ship to, and Matrix shall accept delivery at, that 
address. Matrix shall, within 15 days of shipment by Inneriight, return to Inneriight that portion 
of the price Inneriight paid associated with the type and number of goods returned. 
Dated d/WA. /&> , 2007. 
BY THE COURT , M » F M 
z& Hon trecl D. Howard 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
Attorneys for The MaLrix Group, LLC 
21 
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THIS EXCLUSIVE ttlSTRIBUTOR AGREEMENT i3 made and entered into as of the 
day of ^ 2004, between THE MATRIX GROW> LLC ("Company"), 
and INNERUGHT, INC rDiatribuioO. 
W I T N E S S E T H 
W H H R E ^ f e m s f ^ is licerosd U> sell product* under the brand name "BEVERLY 
SASSOON11 thro^sptiJ^^vorld; and 
WHEItEAS, Distributor dssircs to be the exclusive distributor of certain of Company's 
BKVfiRLV SASSOON brand name products m the multilevel maAetu*&/m$wort: marketing 
industry within the territory more p&rtbuWly described below, and Company is willing to make 
Distributor ik exclusive distributor for such purposes, art! in sccordaiioe with and pursuant to the 
terms and amdirions more fully set forth below; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above, the mutual covenants and agreement? 
$fct forth herein, and other good *ind valuable consideration, the receipt mid arufficittrvcy of which ar& 
hereby acknowledged, tlic parties hereto do hereby Agree as follows; 
L Cpmaaiff f t o ^ t t l ^ p m ff^d Wam^ics. 
The Company hereby represents and Vfitfnmta to Distributor as follows: 
(4) That the Company: 
(i) has a HCCPSS to utilize Ihe BEVERLY SASSOON name on, among 
other things, the Company's cosmetics, eosma^uti^s, ftwrrsseuticab, tanning* 
make-up, vitannns, baby-product? and pet products; and 
(ii) such license is for & stated term at least as long as the term of this 
Agreement; and 
(iii) the aforesaid license ts in full force and effect and Company is not in 
default thereunder; and 
(iv) Company will fceep said license in effect for the full t$rm of tins 
Agirccrnem; and 
(b) That in cooo««ioo with the License Agreement for tine BEVERLY 
SASSOON name with Beverly Saasooo lntcnuitioiuil, LLC ("Licensor"), the Licenw bus 
warranted thrit it has tte rights to the BEVERLY SASSOON name and tfat it will indemnify 
Company from all losses, claims, damages, wards, penalties and injuries which may arise m 
ft* 
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connection with any claim by any third party of any alleged infringement of copyright, trademark or 
otter intellectual property n&hts pertaining lo the use of the BEVERLY SASSOQN name; and 
(c) That in the event any party makes any claim for the infMnseaenent of 
etxpyright, trademark or other intellectual property rights concerning the use of the OEVE&LY 
S ASSOQN bnwd ruune in connection with any of the Products <a& defined below), Company wtti, 
promptly following its receipt of notice of sucti claim from Distributor, call upon Licensor to 
provide, the indemnifications requited oadcr the License Agrecmem between the Company and tte 
Liceaaor and that Company will hold Distributor harmless from all losses* claims, dwi&gefl, awaitis, 
penttlika or injuries nrising out of such infringement claims. 
2. AB^mtmeitufi>i5triM(>r. 
(a) Subject to the terms and provisions set forth in this Agreement, Company 
hereby appoints Distributor as the exclusive distributor for the Products (defined below) within the 
Territory (defined below) insofar »$, but only insofar as, the Industry (defined below) is concerned, 
As m&A herein, the term "Products" shall mean the Company's cosmetics, co&mat&uik&hSt 
nutmeutic&te. tanning, m/dce*up, vtumins, baby-product* and pet products frum time to time 
bearing the BEVERLY SASSOQN name. As used herein, tine term 'Territory" shall include all 
worldwide uuufats, including the United States, exeept for Asia (Am is expressly excluded from 
the Territory)- A$ used herein, the term "Industry7* shall mean the multi-level ?*Mce!inj>; and 
network marketing industries Company expressly agrees that it will not sell Products bearing the 
BEVERLY SASSOON name within the Territory to any other jp^ xty operating wjthb the Industry 
and that Company wffl not itself engage in the Industry- to sell Phraducts bearing the BEVERLY 
SASSOQN nmn& on a multilevel marketing/network mwkcting basis* It is e/cpitrssly understood 
m& agreed* however, not by way of limitation, that the Company may sell BEVERLY SASSOON 
branded products or services other than the Product* to «oy other parties of its choosing, and ihstt 
Company may sell Products bearing the BEVERLY SASSOQN name to any Other parties of its 
choosing who are not involved in the Industry, in any market (worldwide, regional* tecal orother]U 
whether on a retail, wholesale or my ofiwr basis, and that Company may sell pjo4t*ct$ bearing the 
BEVERLY SASSOQN name to companies engaged in the Industry within the continent of Asisu all 
without being in violation of this Agreement 
(b) The acceptance of this appointment by Distributor fa conditioned tipon 
Distributor's written acceptance of Company's Product Price List which shall not be subject to 
chao^euj^U October 17,2006. 
3. Ism-
Subject to the termination rights elsewhere set forth in this Agreement, the tertn of this 
Agreement shall commence as of the date first set forth above and shall end on October 17, 201X 
AH obligations of the Company and ajl rights of Distributor shall cease and terminate at the end of 
the aforesaid term and the Company shall thereafter be under no restrictions insofar as the safe of 
Products fa concerned* 
2 V** 
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The Company advises Distributor that Company has the, right to require the person Beverly 
SaSHOOn to make at least four (4) persona! appearances per year and thai the Company will permit 
Distributor to utilize up to four (4) such personal appearances provided th**t Distributor pays 
Beverly Saasou the required sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500-00) per 
uppcttrwice plus the Distributor sh#|l be obttgrtcd to pay the expenses of Bavcriy Simoon 
associated with the making of such appearances, H is understood that *uch appearance* are subject 
to mutually Agreeable scheduling times, 
5. Minimum Sales Requirement and Termination Rights ftf Company If Mmimutp 
Sfllff? RcflUir^cnts Arc Not Met 
Distributor acknowledges* vndcwwids and agrees that Distributor is receiving e*dusive 
rights to sell Products within the Industry and within the Territory solely because Distributor has 
agreed, end hereby agrees* to purchase Products in at least the minimum OTJotmfci stss. forth Wow *t 
all titles during the term of this /Agreement, Distributor agrees to comply with each "Minimum 
Purchase Rcquircmcntn established below and Distributor acknowledges that Company may 
terminate this Agreement and all of Distributor's rights hereunder and all of Company's obligations 
hereunder in the event Distributor fails to satisfy my Minimum Purchase Requirement At w y time, 
which termination shall be effective upon Company's giving, Distributor ten (JO) d$*ys written notice 
of such termination. The Minimum Purchase Requirements relating to the Products art as follow*; 
(n) Company may terminate this agreement if Distributor does not purchase itt 
least Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000,00) of Products during the twelve-roonlh 
period camrnsnetog October 1& 2004 and ending October 17,2005; and 
(b) Company moy terminate this agreement if Distributor does not purchase at 
least One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (SK50G,000.00) of Products withm the twelve 
(12) month period commencing October 18,2005 m6 ending October 17,2006; and 
(c) During each twelve (12) month period thereafter through and including 
October 17, 2013, Distributor must purchase at least Pour Million Dollars (^ MHUJOG.OG) of 
Products from Distributor during each such twelve (i£) month period (i.c, Distributor rnust 
purchase at least Four Million Dollars (R0004000.00) of Products from DFstributor during the 
period from October t$, 2006 through October 17, 2007, «nd such Four Million Dollars 
($4*000,000.00) pvc year purchase of Ptoducts requtrements from Distributor shall continue <br e*ch 
twelve (12) month period thereafter)-
In order to satisfy the Minimum Purchase Requirements imposed on Distributor pursuant to 
this Agreement, the Distributor must: 
(t) purchase the specified amount of Products within the specific year in 
question and cause Company to r£C*ivc f\*H payment for such Products within <each zwh 
respective year; and 
v 
<£>--' 
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(ii) notwithstanding the forc#oin& Distributor must purchase an amount of 
Products from Company each quarter year period (i.cM each October \& through each 
January J7, and each January J 8 through each April 17, ai*d each April IS through July 17, 
and each July 18 through October 17 during each of nuch years) equal to one-quaner of the 
Minimum Purchase Requirement Amount applicable to the year in question, with payment 
to be received by Company prior to the end of each such applicable quarter. 
6. Limitations and Prohibitions on Distributor 
1! is understood arid agreed that; 
(a) Distributor shall not have or acquire any rights ID my patent*, trademarks, 
servicemarks, trade secret* or any other intellectual property rights relating in any manacr to any of 
the Products or in or to the mnt of BEVERLY SASSOON. 
(b) Distributor ahall have no rights to use the name BEVERLY SASSOOW ou 
any product other than the Products It h expressly undiemood and agreed that Efistributor has 00 
right? to use the name BEVERLY SA5SOON on "Human Hair Cam" rotated products as such 
would violate the terms of Company's license with Lic&i&or. 
tc) Distributor shall make no claims of health benefits, other benefits, or results 
customers could anticipate receiving from BEVERLY SASSOON Products unless such claims arc 
eapreasty authorized in wil ing by Company or are contained on labels or otiwjr salts nwaicriajs 
provided by Company. Distributor shall not make any claims concerning the Products, or 
concerning the BEVERLY SASSOON name, or concerning Beverly Sassoon the person without 
firs* reviving the prior written authorization U> 4o so from Cwnpsxiy which approval may bzgWm 
or withheld within the ?ote discretion of Company. 
(d) Distributor shall not repackage my Product, remove any label or other 
idcntHyisg ranking from aoy Product, or otherwise alter my p&khgwg or tebtf of my Product at 
any lime. Distributor shall not tamper with, alter, modify, change or otherwise affect any Product 
sold to it by Company. 
(e) Distributor shall not #etlr produce, manufacture or otherwise? be involved in <wr 
with reaped to any #orxi$ or products simitar to or in competition in any way with any of ths 
ProduelH during the term of this Agreement. 
(f) Distributor shall comply with all l aw . statutes, rules and regulation* of any 
md all §av&mmcnlAl authorities having juri$diotion over its business opeqaticms, 
(g) Distributor shall market and *c1I the Products, and authorise her distributors 
to market and set) the Products, only within the Industry and only within the Territory. Neither 
Distributor nor any party acquiring the Products through Distributor shall sell the Products other 
than through the multi-lrvel marketing/network marketing channel*. 
<<&s— 
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Except as expressly sot forth heroin, Company makes no representations or warranties ID 
Distributor, either express or implied. SPECIFICALLY, BUT NOT BY WAY OP LIMITATION, 
COMPANY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR FULNESS 
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE W RESPECT OF THE PRODUCTS. 
8< Default. 
(n) The incurrence of any of the following events shall constitute on Even* of 
Dcfauk by Distributor under this Agrcemam: 
(1) Distributor shall foil to satisfy any Minimum Purchase Requirement it 
is obligated to comply with pursuam to the provisions of this Agreement or 
Distributor shall otherwise fail to pay to Company my amount which Distributor is 
obligated to pay to Company; 
(ii) Distributor shall breach or fail to perform any othex duty, obligation 
or Agreement on Distributor's part to be complied with or performed pursuant to fltis 
Agreement ami Distributor simll have failed to satisfy or cure such default within icn 
(10) days after the giving of written notice of such default to Distributor by 
Company; t>r 
(tii) Distributor shall be or become the subject of any bmikruptcy or 
insolvency proceedings. 
(b) Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default, Company may exercise any 
one or more of tht following rights and remedies, all of which shall be mutual and cumulative and 
not exclusive: 
(i) Terminate this Agreement by giving written notice of such 
termination to Distributor; and/or 
(ii) Have and recover fTOm Distributor sli damages suflfe^ ed by Company 
by reason of the occurrence of such Event of Default together with all reasonable attorneys 
fee* md disbursements expended oc inarmed by Company in enforcing or pursuing its rights 
under this Agistment; and/or 
(Hi) Pursue any oifrer rights or remedies available to the Company at law 
or in tHjuity, 
Nothing contained fa thte Agreement shall be construed aa constituting a joint 
venture, partnership, employer/employee relationship, franchise or other association between the 
parties he**fo Distributor is acting onty in the c»p**eity of ait Independent contractor *mf shall have 
£*-
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no authority, express or implied, to bind, obligate or make any commitme»i or representation fo< or 
on behalf of Company, 
Any notice required or permitted to be «iven by -any party to the other under this Agreement shaiJ be 
in 'writing and shall be delivered by nationally recognized overnight dclivciy service, or by certified 
mail with return receipt requested service, delivered to the address for the other party set forth 
below, or such changed address ai» stall have been provided by the other party by a notice duly 
The Matrix Group, LLC 
1177 George Bush Boulevard 
Suite No. 201 
Defray Beach, Florida 33483 
thtarUEht, Inc. 
U7 H»»t 2260 South 
Prow, Utah 84606 
tfffit-
Neither this Agreement nor any lights, duties or obligations hereunder may be assigned by 
Distributor without the prior written consent of Company, which may be given or withheld in its 
soie discretion, 
41 frjiscellflflgflus. 
This Agreement shall be binding upon, snd inure to the benefit of, the parties hereto and 
their respective successors and assigns (provided however, thai nothing contained herein stall be 
construed m authorizing any party to assign any rights or instruments which it has agreed not to 
assign pursuant to provisions hereinabove contained). This Agreement constitute* tlu* entire 
agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended at 
modified except by « written instrument signed by each of tl*c parties hereto. In the event any party 
wnsnences arty action or proceeding to enforce its rights hereunder, the* prevailing party or panics 
in any such action shall be entitled to recover all of their costs and expenses, including reasonable 
attorneys fee$, inclined in connection therewith from the nw-prevaiiing party or parties, both m 
cotuutcttan with tlte original action miating thereto mid any mid fill appeals therefrom. No party 
shall be construed us having; waived any of its rights hereunder unless such waiver shall be m 
writing signed by the party against whom such waiver is being sought. Neither the failure of any 
party to exercise any power given such party hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by any 
other party with its obligations hereunder, nor «ny custom or practice of the parties at variance with 
the terms hereof, shall constitute & waiver of any party's right to demand exact compliance with the 
terms hereof Tiiis Agreement shall be construed and interpreted under the laws of the Stale of 
Florida and the parties agree that any action or proceeding brought concerning this Agreement may 
be brought only in the couns of Palm Beach County, Florida, and each party hereto hereby consents 
to the jurisdiction of such courts. The parties agree that this Agreement is the result of negotiation 
by the putties, each of whom was represented by counsel, and thus, this Agreement shall not be 
given hereundex. 
If to Company: 
If to Distributor: 
6 
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construed against the drafter thereof. No representations, inducement, prunuKes or agreements, 
oral or otherwise, between the parties not embodied herein or incorporated herein by reference shall 
he of any force or effect This Agreement nwy be executed in arty number of courrteypwr**, each of 
which shall be deemed to be un originaL but all of which, when taken together, shall constitute but 
one and the same instrument. AD references herein ro the aiugular shall include plural, »nd id! 
references herein to the masculine gender shall include the feminine and neuter genders, and vice 
versa. 
IK WITNESS WHEREOF, the- parties hereto have executed this instrument as of tkz date 
first aet forth above, 
THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC 
»y- /rszf^£2^ 
lis tA-Jfy 
INNERL1GHT, INC.. 
Bv /Ofa)L>. «if. ff\ <° 6~*lXy 
Its (~fl£& .ffcrnj" 
7 
David L. Arlington (4267) 
Matthew G. Grimmer (9692) 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Post Office Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
Telephone: (801) 415-3000 
Thomas F.J. MacAnifT 
PA Attorney I.D. No. 01895 
Ursula H. Leo 
PA Attorney I.D. No. 91281 
EASTBURN AND GRAY. P.C. 
60 East Court Street 
Doylestown, PA 18901 
Telephone: (215) 345-7000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Innerlight, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INNERLIGHT, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WESLEY TATE 
(Supporting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment) 
Civil No. 060400775 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
UTAH COUNTY ) 
WESLEY TATE, having been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over 21 years of age and have personal knowledge of, and am 
competent to testify to, the following. 
2. I began work for Innerlight, Inc., ("Innerlight") on February 10, 2001, as 
Innerlighfs Director of Operations. My current position at Innerlight is Executive Vice 
President and Chief Operating Officer. 
3. My current responsibilities include oversight and day-to-day management 
and control of the Innerlight. 
4. I am familiar with that certain writing entitled "Exclusive Distributor 
Agreement" (the "Agreement"), attached to Innerlight's Complaint in this action. I am 
familiar with the language appearing in paragraph 2 (b) of the Agreement. 
5. Innerlight has not made written acceptance to The Matrix Group, LLC 
("Matrix"), of a fixed product price list from Matrix. 
6. Innerlight has never received a fixed product price list from Matrix. 
7. Innerlight has made no written waiver of any Agreement term, including 
its right to approve a Matrix fixed product price list before contractually obligating itself 
to perform under the Agreement. 
8. Innerlight has never intended to waive its rights under the Agreement. 
9. Innerlight placed one order to Matrix for each of the five Sassoon 
cosmetic products using one purchase order for each product, all five of which were sent 
on the same day. See Product Purchase Orders, attached hereto as Attachments 1-5. 
10. During the same period Innerlight placed its product order with Matrix, 
Innerlight also placed one order for certain incidental accessories, i.e., boxes, sponges, 
etc., (using separate purchase orders). 
11. In response to Innerlight's product order, Innerlight received seven 
invoices, six from Natural Bronze, LLC ("Natural Bronze"), and one from Matrix. See 
Product Invoices, attached hereto as Attachments 6-12. Innerlight has not contracted 
with Natural Bronze to provide any Beverly Sassoon cosmetic products. 
12. Upon receiving invoices for its product order, Innerlight made seven 
product payments to Natural Bronze. Innerlight did not make any payments to Matrix on 
any product or accessory invoices, but only made one payment to Matrix for an 
appearance fee. See Product Payments, attached hereto as Attachments 13-19. 
13. Following the sale of certain Sassoon products purchased from Matrix, 
Innerlight received complaints from customers including, that a facial product caused 
"burning" to the customer's skin, that a lotion was "runny," and that lotion pumps were 
inoperable. 
Dated this A / day of September, 20p6. 
V / We^6yfate 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me, this l in day of September, 2006. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
ROSEMARY HUlSrfl 
111N200W 
Provo, UT 84601 
My Commission Expires 
November 14,2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
uxu 
Notarv^rublic 
Residing a t ^ T X / H I k i t i J h My commission expires: j [ (4 01 
Summary of Attachments 
to 
Affidavit of Wes Tate 
(Supporting Innerlight's A/lotion for Summary Judgment) 
Runchase? 
Orders 
Attachment 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Purchase Order 
Submitted To 
Matrix 
Matrix 
Matrix 
Matrix 
Matrix 
Purchase 
Order Number 
20978 
20979 
20980 
20981 
20982 
Order Date 
10/11/2004 
10/11/2004 
10/11/2004 
10/11/2004 
10/11/2004 
Sassoon Product Description 
Skin-Deep OxyPlex 
Facial Cleanser 
Day Creme with SPF 20 
24-7 pHydration TR Treatment 
DermaPeel Complex 
Quantity 
10,000 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
Total Price 
$78,500 00 
$13,750 00 
$29,500 00 
$28,750 00 
$112,500 00 I 
Invoices 
/Attachment 
Number 
;.^MUMfi 
$mm$mm 
Invoice From: 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Invoice Number 
1446 
1447 
Invoice Date 
10/21/2004 
10/21/2004 
88M9HH 
ztfrm&ii 
&&mm-4 
s&mmg# 
mmmm 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Matrix 
1464 
1466 
1467 
1468 
1506 
11/16/2004 
11/16/2004 
11/16/2004 
11/16/2004 
12/6/2004 l 
Sassoon Product Description 
Skin-Deep OxyPlex 
Day Creme with SPF 20 
24-7 pHydration TR Treatment 
Facial Cleanser 
DermaPeel Complex 
Facial Cleanser 
Day Creme with SPF 20 
24-7 pHydration TR Treatment 
DermaPeel Complex 
Day Creme with SPF 20 
Invoice 
Quantity 
10,000 
971 
971 
955 
971 
4,045 
I 3,477 
! 4,029 
4,029 
536 
Invoice I 
Total Price 
$78,500 00 
$5,728.90 
$5,583.25 
$2,626.25 
$21,847 50 
$10,535.25 
$20,514.30 
$23,166 75 
$90,652 50 
$3,162 40 j 
§amm^ 
Mtachmerit 
Number 
1.3, 
n 
as 
1i6 
w 
m 
19, 
Payee on Check 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Natural Bronze 
Check Number 
64864 
64865 
65084 
65086 
65087 
65105 
65451 
Date on 
Check 
10/31/2004 
10/31/2004 
12/9/2004 
12/9/2004 
12/9/2004 
12/9/2004 
2/25/2005 
Check ] 
Amount 
$35,785 90 
$78,500 00 
$90,652 50 
$20,514 30 
$23,166.75 
$9,934.38 
$3,162 40 
' Additional purchase orders-not included in this one-time order of cosmetic products-were 
submitted for incidental accessories (boxes, sponges, etc ) 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #1 
«>60S 
JT 84606 
PO NUMBER: 20978 
The PO number must appear on all related correspondence, 
shipping papers, and invoices. 
Phone 801 -65MJ605 
Fax 801 -65&-0622 
George Bush Blvd #101 
ay, FL 33482 
'hone No: (888) 862-3227 
:axNo: (561)330-7596 
/endor ID. No. 6 2 2 
)ATE 
I/2004 
REQUISITIONER 
Kathy Christiansen 
SHIP TO 
InnerLight Inc. 
867 E 2260 S 
PROVO, UT 84606 
Phone (801) 65 5-0605 
SHIP VIA F.O.B. POINT DISCOUNT TERMS 
None 
WAREHOUSE 
JTY ITEM DESCRIPTION 
UNIT 
PRICE 
TOTAL 
PRICE 
3,000 510000 
9l4l 
510000: Skin-Deep OxyPlex'' 7.8500 78,500.00 
TOTAL: 78,500.00 
Please send two copies of your Invoice. 
Enter this orderin accordance with the prices, terms, delivery method 
and specifications listed above. 
Please notify us immediately If you arc unable to ship as specified. 
Send invoice lo: 
tanerUghl Inc. 
.G7E22S0S 
frovo.UT B4B06 Authorized uf' 
Panp 1 nf 1 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #2 
ERLifiJl 
»60 S 
Jl 34606 
V\J n u i m u u i \ t 
The PO number musl appear on all related correspondence 
shipping papers, and invoices. 
Phone 801 -655-0605 
Fax 801-655-0622 
1 George Bush Blvd #101 
•ay, FL 33482 
3hone No: (888) 862-3227 
-ax Ho: (561)330-7596 
/endor ID. No. 622 
SHIP TO 
InnerLight Inc. 
867 E 2260 S 
PROVO, UT 84606 
Phone (801) 655-0605 
)ATE 
1/2004 
2TY 
REQUISITIONER 
Kathy Christiansen 
SHIP VIA 
ITEM DESCRIPTION 
F.OB. POINT DISCOUNT TERMS 
None 
WAREHOUSE | 
1 
UNIT TOTAL 
PRICE PRICE 
.;000 520000 520000: Sassoon Facial Cleanser 2.7500 13,750,00 
TOTAL: 13,750.00 
Please send two copies of your Invoice. 
Enter this order In accordance with the prices, terms, delivery method 
and specifications listed above. 
Please notHy us Immediately if ycu arc unable to ship as spec Hied. 
Send invoice to: 
InnerLight Inc. 
867 E 2260 S 
frwo.UT 84606 
Authorized by 
Page 1 of 1 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #3 
ERLlfiHTi 
i60 S 
IT RiimR 
Phone 801-655-0605 
Fay Rni-fifi5-Ofi2? 
PO NUMBER: 20&B0 
The PO number musl appear on all related correspondence, 
shipping papers, and invoices. 
alrix 
77 George Bush Blvd#l 01 
dray, FL 33482 
Dhone No: 
rax No: 
(888)862-3227 
(561)330-7596 
/endor ID. No. 622 
SHIP TO 
InnerLighl Inc. 
867 E 2260 S 
PROVO, UT 84606 
Phone (801) 655-0605 
)ATE REQU1SITIONER SHIP VIA F.O.B. PCHNT DISCOUNT TERMS WAREHOUSE 
1/2004 Kathy Christiansen None 
2TY ITEM DESCRIPTION 
UNIT 
PRICE 
TOTAL 
PRICE 
i.OOO 520010 520010: Sassoon Day Creme with SPF20 5.9000 29,500.00 
TOTAL: 29,500.00 
Please send two copies of your invoice. 
Enter this orderin accordance with (he prices, ferms, delivery method 
and specifications listed above. 
Please notify us immediately J/ ycu arc until* to ship as specif kd. 
Send invoice to: 
InnerLighl inc. 
367 E 2260 S 
/rovo.UT B4606 
AutlJorireoby 
-AtfiA 
Date 
Page 1 of 1 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #4 
50 S 
JT B4606 
Phone 801-655-0605 
Fav RM-fW-nR?2 
PO NUMBER: 2 0 9 8 1 
The PO number must appear on all rel sled correspondence, 
shipping papers, and invoices. 
Lrix 
7 George Bush BlvdtflOl 
ray, FL 33482 
(888) 862-3227 
(561)330-7596 
/endor ID. No. 622 
'hone No: 
:ax No: 
SHIP TO 
InnerLight Inc 
867 E 2260 S 
PROVO, UT 84606 
Phone (801) 655-0605 
>ATE 
I/2004 
REQUISITIONER 
Kathy Christiansen 
SHIP VIA F.O.B. POINT DISCOUNT TERMS 
None 
WAREHOUSE 
L _ . 
3TY ITEM DESCRIPTION 
UNIT 
PRICE 
TOTAL 
PRICE 
,000 
HI 
520020 520020: Sassoon 24-7 pHydration TR Treatment 5.7500 28,750.00 
TOTAL: 28,750.00 
1 ease sond two copies of your Invoice. 
inter this order In accordance with the pnces, terms, delivery method 
ind specifications listed above. 
'tease notKy us Immediately If you are unable to ship as specified. 
>end invoice lo: 
nnerLight Inc. 
PE2280S 
,UT 84G06 
<j7 3 
iovo.l 
Authorized by / Date 
A _ r A 
Exhibit D 
Attaclmient #5 
[RUG in 
>60 S 
UT 84606 
PO NUMBER: 2 0 9 8 2 
The PO number must appear on all related correspondence, 
shipping papers, and invoices. 
Phone 801-655-0605 
Fax 801-655-0622 
.trix 
H George Bush Blvd #101 
Iray, FL 33482 
Phone No: (888) 862-3227 
Fax No: (561)330-7596 
Vendor ID. No. 622 
SHIP TO 
InnerLight inc. 
867 E 2260 S 
PROVO. UT 84606 
Phone (801) 655-0605 
DATE 
1/2004 
QTY 
),000 
REQUISITIONER 
Kathy Christiansen 
SHIP VIA F.O.B. POINT 
ITEM DESCRIPTION 
520030 52003C I: DermaPeel C< Dmplex 
DISCOUNT TERMS 
None j 
WAREHOUSE | 
I 
UNrr TOTAL 
PRICE PRICE 
22.5000 112,500.00 
11 
TOTAL: 112,500.00 
Please send two copies of your Invoice, 
Enter this order In accordance with the prices, terms, delivery method 
and specifications listed above. 
Please notify us immediately If you arc unable to ship as specified. 
Send invoice to: 
InnerLight inc. 
8G7EZ260S 
>rovo,UT 84606 uJLfJl. 
Authorized by Oate 
D-^r-ir^ A *-.* 
Exhibit D 
Attaclimenl #6 
Natural Bronze Invoice 
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 201 
1.177 George Bush B l v d 
Defray Beach, FL 3 3 4 8 3 
Dale 
10/21/2004 
Invoiced 1 
1440 
lb\ 
Bin To 
Innerhght 
Kulhy GbrltiUamien 
867 H 2260 S 
Provo,UTK4606 
Ship To 
binerlight 
iCathy Chriatinnaen 
R67E2260S 
Provo, UT R4606 
P.O. Number 
20978 
Quantity 
Terme 
Due. on receipt 
Item Code 
Rap 
HA 
Ship 
10/11/2004 
Via F.O.B. 
Description 
Project! 
Price Each Ambunt 
10,000 510000 Skin-Deep OxyPlex 7.S5 
(A Hf\ 
^ 
fa**" Jd or <\ v^ \ 
<bt& M 
PK,5MUX) 
^ A J 1 
i-.l II I I . I J | - » U _ I 
Exhibit D 
Attaclimenl #7 
Natural Bronze 
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 201 
1 ] 77 George BUG!) Blvd 
D e l m y B o a o h , F L 33483 
Invoice 
Date 
10/21/2004 
Invoioo # | 
1447 
Bill To 
Innerlight 
Kuthy Chrisl'ianacn 
867 E 22.60 fi 
Provo.UT 84606 
Ship To 
lnnerlighl 
lCaliiy Chrictiwuen 
c/o Tuacany Suites 
LUD Vcguu 
Terms 
Due on receipt: 
Rep 
HA 
Ship 
10/14/2004 
Via 
UPS 
F.O.B. 
CA 
ProJBd 
Description 
Suauocm Pay Creme with SPF20 
bassoon. 24-7 pHydrnticm TR IVeatmcnt 
Sassoan Facial ClcaoHcr 
DcrniuPeel Complex 
| Balance of Order to Ship "WudncaduY, October 27,2004 \ 
Price Eaeh 
5.90 
5.75 
2.75 
22.50 
Amount 
Saloon Day Crane with SPF20 
Sassoon 24-7 pHydrution TR MVeatraont 
S as BO on Facial Qcunucr 
DcimuPwl Comply 
Total 
• .5,728.90 
5,5S3.25 
.2,626.25 
21
 TB47.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
?0 
S35.7C5.90 ! 
Exhibit D 
Attaclimeiit #8 
Natural Bronze 
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 201 
1177 Geoi^c Bush Blvd 
Dclray Beach, FL 33483 
Invoice 
1 Date 
; I i/16/2004 
Invoice # 
J 464 
Bill To 
Inncrlight 
K-athy Chrlatlmxcn 
867 B22608 
Provo, UnMfiOfi 
Ship To 
Innerllghf 
Kttthy Christiansen 
867 B 2260 S 
Prove, UT 84606 
/<? 
=>.0. Number 
20979 
Quantity 
•4,045 
Term6 
Due on receipt 
Item Code 
520000 
Rep 
HA 
Ship 
11/16/2004 
Vte 
Description 
Saasoon Facial Cleanser 
Order is complete! 
PPROVED 
F.O.B. 
CA 
Project 
Price Each 
2.7i 
Amount 
0.635.2S 
Total ShJ.33.7S 
Exhibit D 
Attacliment #9 
Natural Bronze 
Qulf Stream Building, Suite 201 
1177 George BushBlvd 
Dclray Beach, FL 33483 
invoice 
| Date 
11/16/21)04 
Invoice # i 
1466 
Bill To 
innorligbl 
Kuthy Christiansen 
B67E2260S 
l»rovofUT*4iiOCi 
ShlpTo 
Inncriight 
Ktttby Chrirtianfion 
867 E 2260 fi 
PIOYO,UT84M)6 
0. Number Terms Rep Ship Vb F.O.B. Project 
20980 Due on receipt MA 11/16/2004 CA 
auantity Item Cod© DeeorlpUon Price Each Amoun 
J 3,477 520010 Sassoon Day Crcmt with SPF20 
552 Pieces to fallow 
5.<J0 20,514.30 
/APPROVED 
Total 520,514.30 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #10 
Natural Bronze Invoice 
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 2 0 1 
1177 George Bush Blvd 
Delray Beach, FL 33483 
L D**te 
11/16/2004 
Invoice # 
1467 
Bill To 
Innorlight 
Kufhy Girisiiansen 
867 H 2260 S 
ProvojUT 84606 
Ship To 
Inncrlighl 
KnrhyChrJfltlanBon 
867E2260 g 
Provo,UT 84606 
' ^ 7 
l
.O. Number 
20981 
Quantity 
J 
4,029 
Terms 
Due on receipt 
Item Code 
520020 
Rep 
HA 
Ship 
11/16/2004 
Via F.O.B, 
CA 
Description 
Sassoon 24-7 pHydration TR Treatment 
Order is complete! 
-TVT 
PPROVED 
-C-
Project 
Price Each 
5.75 
Amount 
23,166.75 
Total 523,166.75 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #12 
Matrix Group LLC 
1355 West Palmetto Parle Road 
Suite #348 
Boon Raton, FL 33486 
Invoice 
Date 
12/6/2004 
Involoe # 
1506 
BUI To 
lnnet%ht 
KnthY Christiansen 
B67E22G0S 
Provo, U7* S4f»06 
P.O. No. 
20980 
Termo 
Due on rccaipt 
Project 
•Quantity 
si 
Description 
Sassoan Day Creme with SPF20 
OVED 
Rate 
5.90 
Total 
Amount 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #13 
irLight Inc. 64864 
NATURAL BRONZE ' m ! / 2 0 0 4 
a t c Type Reference Original Ami. Balance Due Discount Paymenl 
Y71/2004 Bill 1447 35,785.90 35,785.90 35,785.90 
Check Amount 35,785.90 
ions Expense INVOICE//1447 35,785.90 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #14 
L e r L i g h t I n c . 
NATURAL BRONZE 
Dale 
111 1/2004 
Type 
Bill 
Reference 
1446 
Original Ami. 
78,500.00 
Balance Due 
78,500.00 
10/31/2004 
Discount 
Check Amount 
U * t U U J 
Paymenl 
78,500.00 
78,500.00 
Zions Expense INVOICE* 1446 78,500.00 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #15 
NATURAL BRONZE 12/9/2004 
Date Type Reference Original Ami Balance Due Discounl Payment 
I l/J 6/2004 Bill 1468 90,652 50 90,652 50 90,652 50 
Check Aniounl 90,652 50 
Zions Expense INVOICE* 1468 90,652.50 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #16 
NATURAL BRONZE 
Dale Type Reference 
11/16/2004 Bill 1466 
Original Ami. 
20,514.30 
Balance Due 
20,514.30 
12/9/2004 
Discount 
Check Amount 
Payment 
20,514.30 
20,514.30 
Zions Expense INVOICE// 1466 
20,514.30 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #17 
Date 1 ype Reference 
11/16/2004 Bill 1467 
Original Ami 
23,166 75 
Balance Due Discount 
23,166 75 
Check Amount 
Payment 
23,166 75 
23,166 75 
Zions Expense rNVOICEtf 1467 
23,166 75 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #18 
e'rLight Inc. 
NATURAL BRONZE 
) a l c Type Reference 
\ /16/2004 
/19/2004 
Bill 
Bill 
1464 
1505 
Original Ami. 
10,535.25 
4,794.51 
Balance Due 
9.93438 
600.87 
12/9/2004 
Disco unl 
Check Amounl 
Payment 
9,934.38 
600.87 
10,535.25 
INVOICE// 1464 Zions Expense 1,NYW 
10,535.25 
Exhibit D 
Attachment #19 
ICK: 065451 02/25/2005 NATURAL BRONZE CHECK TOTAL: 22,823.92 
NT UTiiuusA srsLi cOTSoatm iz/on 
